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ABSTRACT
COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS
ASSOCIATED WITH
LOCAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERAITON
Sarin Adhikari
May 8, 2015
Metropolitan fragmentation is considered the root cause of inequality among local
governments. Self-governing localities have the power to exercise zoning and land-use
laws to lock up their resources, which gives them a competitive edge against their
neighbors. Localities are unique in terms of their economic capacity, fiscal strength,
geographic location, racial makeup of their residents and their income status. Such
differences reflect into variation in preference for urban infrastructure and the capacity of
local governments to provide preferred services at the lowest possible taxes and fees.
Some scholars have suggested consolidating localities into large regional governments to
overcome such inequalities. However, studies focused on consolidated regional
governments show that they have not been successful in fulfilling their promises. This
manuscript is predicated on the argument that production of urban services need not be
competitive as its provision, and localities can reap benefits of scale-economy and
standardization of services through voluntary mutual cooperation and policy coordination
without having to abdicate their rights of self-governance. The purpose of this manuscript
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is to identify various economic, political, social, and geographic characteristics of
localities that influence the extent of cooperation among them. This manuscript intends to
do that by using aggregate data and quantitative methods designed to overcome
weaknesses faced by previous studies.
The data used for this analysis comes from 1,164 general purpose local
governments–cities,

municipalities,

counties,

and

townships–within

51

largest

metropolitan statistical areas in the United States. It uses robust linear regression to
identify causal relationship between variables representing local economic, social,
political, and geographic characteristics and the extent of interlocal cooperation among
localities. Metropolitan fragmentation, growth in the developmental sector, fiscal stress,
poverty, and the senior population are found to positively influence local governments’
decision to cooperate with their neighbors. Conversely, property value, growth in
manufacturing sector, higher percentage of whites and the rich are found to negatively
influence cooperation decisions. Similarly, localities in close proximity are found to
engage less in interlocal cooperation, whereas African-American population is found to
have no substantial influence on cooperation decisions. Besides, cities and municipalities
are found to engage more in interlocal cooperation than counties, and localities in the
South are found to be less inclined to pursue interlocal cooperation than the rest of the
country.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Background
The political geography of metropolitan America is highly fragmented. According
to the 2012 Census of Governments, there are altogether 90,056 local governments in the
United States. Forty three percent (38,910) of those are general-purpose governments,
and 56 percent (51,146) are special–purpose governments. The population1 of the United
States as estimated by the American Community Survey for the year 2012 was
309,138,711, which suggests that one local government serves approximately 3000
people in this country. Public-choice theory adequately explains why so many local
governments exist. The Tiebout model of population distribution suggests that
proliferation of local governments within metropolitan geography results from peoples’
preference for specific bundles of urban services and infrastructure. Tiebout claims that
local jurisdictions seek to attract wealthy residents by providing them lucrative bundles of
urban services and taxes (Tiebout, 1956). As much as numerous small autonomous
jurisdictions are praised for their responsiveness to their citizens’ preferences, efficiency
in service provision, self-determination, fiscal accountability, and political representation,
they are equally despised for inequality, spillover costs, and unresponsive attitudes
towards policy externalities (ACIR, 1985, 1987; Downs, 1994; Miller, Miranda, Roque,
& Wilf, 1995; Nice, 1987; Oakerson, 1999; Parks & Oakerson, 1989, 1993). Various
1

urban problems — racial imbalance, economic inequality, protection of privileges,
exploitation of central cities by their suburbs, inner-city isolation, lack of affordable
housing, accessibility to urban services, traffic congestion, lack of rational land use,
commitment to environmental values, air and water pollution, and excessive loss of open
space — have been associated with metropolitan fragmentation resulting from autonomy
and self-governance (Downs, 1994; Ross & Levine, 1996).
For over thirty years urban scholars have focused their research on various models
of metropolitan governance with a unitary objective of finding solutions to the problems
arising from fragmentation and segregation (Dodge, 1996; Orfield, 1997a, 1997b; Rusk,
1993, 1999; Savitch & Vogel, 2000). There is a general consensus that a regional solution
is needed to solve those problems, but scholars are divided on which model of regional
governance is the most appropriate. The divide boils down to the dichotomy between
regional government and regional governance. The proponents of regional government
envision an overarching area-wide consolidated metropolitan government as an ideal
model. They also suggest an alternative model of multi-tiered nested government where
complete consolidation is difficult to achieve (Norris, 2001; Rusk, 1993, 1999).
Metropolitan governance, on the other hand, focuses on functionally overlapping, crosscutting, and flexible cooperative networks between localities, thereby forming a regional
ecosystem without the rigidity of an overarching administrative structure (Feiock, 2009;
Feiock, Tao, & Johnson, 2004; Oakerson, 2004; Parks & Oakerson, 1989, 2000; Savitch
& Vogel, 2000).
Structural reform is less popular among urban voters (Carr & Feiock, 1999;
Walker, 1987). Reforms such as consolidation of city and county governments have not
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been successful in keeping all of the promises made for improved efficiency, economic
growth, fiscal improvement, and equity (Blomquist & Parks, 1995; Carr & Feiock, 1999;
Feiock, Carr, & Johnson, 2006; Kelly & Adhikari, 2013; Rosentraub, 2000; H.V. Savitch,
Vogel, & Ye, 2010). Regional governmental structures that use command-and-control
mechanisms are also considered ineffective (Polanyi, 1998) because they accrue higher
transaction costs (Oakerson, 2004).
Governance without a government, on the other hand, has been attributed as the
easiest method for regional collective action; and governance through a network of
voluntary interlocal cooperation is considered to be the easiest of them all (Savitch &
Vogel, 2000; Walker, 1987). Parks and Oakerson believe that metropolitan governance
can occur without metropolitan government even in highly fragmented metropolitan areas
(Oakerson, 1999; Parks & Oakerson, 2000). Even though jurisdictions compete for the
provision of urban services and infrastructures, the production of those services need not
be an outcome of a competitive process (Howell-Moroney, 2008; V. Ostrom, Tiebout, &
Warren, 1961). Cooperation and competition among jurisdictions are not mutually
exclusive. Jurisdictions can as easily decide to cooperate or collaborate with one another
on production and simultaneously compete on provision of services (V. Ostrom et al.,
1961). While provision decisions are political in nature, production decisions are purely
economic.
Fragmented metropolitan areas are envisioned to be composed of a number of
provision and production units competing as well as cooperating with one another
thereby forming a complex local public economy (Oakerson, 1999). Besides, cooperative
networks among competing jurisdictions have been seen not only in producing urban
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services, but also in planning and developing major infrastructure improvements such as
ports, airports, business parks, and convention centers (Feiock et al., 2004; Wallis,
1994c).

What Is Interlocal Cooperation?
Interlocal cooperation can be defined as effort for collective action between two
or more local government entities for service delivery, economic development, land-use
planning, environment protection, and mutually beneficial policies. Depending on their
nature, common local policies can be broadly classified as those involving mutual action
and/or coordination in production and/or provision of urban services and infrastructure
(constructive policies) and mutual policies that are focused on compensating for any
negative externalities impacting other jurisdictions (restorative policies). For localities to
engage in cooperation with one another, the transaction cost of participating in such an
endeavor needs to be sufficiently low (North, 1990; Williamson, 1979, 1981), and
localities need to be willing to reciprocate on the cooperative actions of their neighbors
(Axelrod & Bennett, 1993; Axelrod, 1984; E. Ostrom, 1998). The easiest approaches to
regional service delivery by Walker (1987) include informal cooperation, interlocal
service contracts, and joint power agreements. Similarly, Oakerson (1999) has suggested
in-house production, coordinated production, joint production, intergovernmental
contracting, private contracting, franchising, and vouchering as different ways to link
provision to production. Cooperation forged through a binding contract is considered
formal, and the one not documented formally is informal – also called the handshake deal
(Post, 2002). Informal agreements are perpetuated on the grounds of reciprocity of action
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and mutual trust between participants (Post, 2002; Walker, 1987). Interlocal service
contracts are voluntary formal agreements popular among local governments in
metropolitan regions (Walker, 1987). Joint power agreements are formal arrangements
between two or more local governments for joint planning, financing, and delivery of
services to citizens of the participating jurisdictions (Walker, 1987).
Formal contracts are more stable and less risky to the participants. However,
short-term, ad hoc relationships provide the flexibility for localities to quickly retreat
from a less beneficial relationship and enter into a different one that provides better
outcomes. Additionally, Post (2002) classifies collective action as one that involves
exchange of funds and one that involves bartering services with no financial transaction.
A local government might exchange a service in return for another service of equal value
rendered by a neighboring locality and, hence, avoid exchanging funds. In another case, a
group of localities might cooperatively decide to set uniform local tax rates across the
region that also do not necessarily require monetary exchange. Relationships that include
exchange of funds are more easily quantifiable than those that do not.

Need for Interlocal Cooperation
The primary reason for interlocal cooperation is that localities have nothing to
gain from unyielding competition. Conventional theory suggest that local jurisdictions
must be in competition with each other to gain elite interests and therby enhance fiscal
conditions at the expense of the others (Tiebout, 1956). The competition is so severe that
cities must constantly seek investment in developmental infrastructure and explore
various tactics to reduce taxes to look attractive to potential residents and businesses.
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Cities are forced to pursue developmental initiatives regardless of whether these policies
are the most beneficial (Peterson, 1981).
However, local competition is a zero-sum game in which one jurisdiction loses
while the other wins. To keep winning the competitive game, localities risk large
investments on potentially attractive projects and make unprofitable deals with big
businesses in anticipation of future benefits. Extravagant competitive spending and
astronomical debts accrued in the process put localities on a downward spiral often
referred to as a race-to-the-bottom (Savitch, Kantor, & Vicari, 2002).
Furthermore, studies have shown that localities in city centers and suburbs are
economically linked and share a common economic fate. Suburbs cannot thrive if their
central cities are withering (Ledebur & Barnes, 1992; Savitch, Collins, Sanders, &
Markham, 1993; Voith, 1998). Localities sharing a regional geography are economically
connected to a common regional market that thrives when all units in the region have
healthy economies (Barnes & Ledebur, 1998).
In the current era of globalization, metropolitan regions from around the world
compete for economic resources. Since localities are the building-blocks of metropolitan
regions, globalization puts them in direct competition with their peers from around the
world for specialized services and labor-intensive jobs (Barnes & Ledebur, 1998; Sassen,
1991; Short, 2004). Fragmented economic resources and competitive attitudes among
localities limit the ability of the metropolitan regions to compete with their global
counterparts. Other social and political problems at the local level also affect global
competitiveness of city-regions. Localities are better off collaborating with one another to
reap collective benefits gained by attracting global resources (Dodge, 1990, 1996).
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Cost saving through economies of scale has been cited as strong rationale for
cities to cooperate (J. Ferris & Graddy, 1986; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Sonenblum,
Kirlin, & Ries, 1977; Stein, 1990). In a study conducted by the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), more than half of the respondent cities mentioned
economies of scale as the primary reason for entering into a regional coalition (ACIR,
1985). Whereas localities can decide to jointly produce urban services to achieve scale
economy, smaller localities unable to produce capital-intensive services can also ensure
service continuity by cooperating with a larger neighboring locality (Post, 2002). Use of
cooperative methods for continued access to desired urban services has been documented
by Ugboro et al. as well (Ugboro, Obeng, & Talley, 2001).
Cities can internalize both positive and negative cross-border spillovers by
enacting common policies (Feiock, 2007). They can also get compensated for lost
revenues resulting from cross-border inequalities by a cooperative system of revenue
sharing among neighboring jurisdictions (Pack, 1998; Rothenberg, 1992). Improvement
of business climate and the ability to capture wandering businesses has been suggested as
strong motivation for interlocal cooperation (Nunn & Rosentraub, 1997).
Interlocal cooperation is also considered a viable option for localities to relieve
their fiscal stress and enhance their fiscal capacity. Local governments can enhance their
fiscal capacity by dumping costly in-house production in favor of a joint production
structure (ACIR, 1985). Scale economy and access to relatively cheap services can help
move low-service, high-tax communities toward a more competitively priced bundle of
services (Miller et al., 1995). According to Miller (1995), communities with high tax
effort and low tax yield are considered to be in the state of fiscal stress. Joint planning,
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changes in incompatible land uses, uniform tax rates (or shared revenue), and
standardized urban services create a leveled playing field among neighboring localities
thereby reducing disparity among them. Residents and businesses, then, have fewer
incentives to relocate thereby improving tax yield of previously stressed localities.
Standardizing services and minimizing spatial disparity can help recovery in hollowing
city centers thus improving overall regional competitiveness (Liebman, Herman,
Williams, & Dye, 1963).

Unanswered Questions about Interlocal Cooperation
Fragmented governments in metropolitan regions are considered the leading cause
of socioeconomic variations between localities. Fragmentation perpetuates the status quo
which is structurally supported homogenous segregation. It is natural to conclude that
what has caused metropolitan areas to fragment is also what prevents them from
engaging in a collective action. Urbanists strongly agree that citizens have unequal needs
and preferences and they prefer to segregate in fragmented communities (ACIR, 1987;
Nice, 1987), that fragmentation causes competition between localities (Post, 2004a;
Tiebout, 1956), and that fragmented localities find it difficult to cooperate. However,
studies have also found that competition and cooperation can coexist (Feiock, 2004; E.
Ostrom, 1990, 2000) and that localities cooperate with one another even when
competition is the accepted norm (Goetz & Kayser, 1993). Some studies claim that
fragmentation does not negatively impact interlocal cooperation (Feiock et al., 2004) and
even take the argument a step further suggesting that fragmentation increases probability
of cooperation by simply increasing the number of potential collaborators (Campbell &
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Glynn, 1990). The very nature of fragmentation by preferential sorting suggests that
localities that share a common geography do not necessarily share characteristic
similarities. It is important to understand how local characteristics affect interlocal
cooperation and to identify why some localities with certain characteristics cooperate
more than others.
Earlier literature on interlocal relationships suggest that localities are the building
blocks of the local public economy that interact in a regional common market (Barnes &
Ledebur, 1998; Oakerson, 1999; Parks & Oakerson, 1989), but the literature fails to
discuss how characteristic variations of these localities affect their ability to contribute in
the regional marketplace. The transaction-cost theory builds a purely economic argument
based on relative cost of engaging into cooperation (Williamson, 1979), but it does not
elaborate on what constitutes the variation in transaction costs. Extant literature suggests
that transaction costs can be minimized by smaller group sizes (number of localities
engaged in cooperation), smaller jurisdictions, closer proximity, and contiguity (Ferris &
Graddy, 1991; Liebman et al., 1963; Olson, 1971; Post, 2002; Williamson, 1979), but it
does not elaborate on the role of socio-economic and political characteristics of localities
on their decision to engage in collective action.
Scholars have suggested that racial variations (Feiock et al., 2004; Ferris &
Graddy, 1986; Post, 2004a) and fiscal condition of localities (Downs, 1994; Ferris &
Graddy, 1986; K. A. Foster, 1997; Haughwout, 1999; Heeg, Klagge, & OssenbrÜGge,
2003; Sonenblum et al., 1977) possibly influence interlocal cooperation. Outcomes from
those studies and their limitations will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Purpose and Importance of This Research
This manuscript is predicated on the assumption that ad hoc cooperation between
local governments is the path to metropolitan governance, and the success of such
cooperative governance depends on the ease of forming cooperative networks. Every
jurisdiction has a unique set of socio-economic characteristics that influences its
cooperative relationships with its neighbors. The body of literature on interlocal relations
and its role in building cooperative regional governance is very strong. Studies shed light
on the influence of the characteristic uniqueness of localities on interlocal cooperation,
but most of them are focused on specific metropolitan areas. Some of them are very old,
and others fail to provide conclusive findings. The literature lacks large aggregate
analysis on interlocal relations based on recent data and robust quantitative methods
producing conclusive results that can be trustfully generalized. This manuscript is an
attempt to fill that void. This research attempts to answer the question, “Why do some
localities cooperate more than others?”
Additionally, this research explores how variations among fragmented localities
affect their desire and capacity to cooperate with their neighbors. It also addresses why
some localities cooperate more than others. This research identifies stereotypes of
localities for further research and academic discussions. The literature on regionalism has
established that regional governance does not have a one-size-fits-all model. The
outcome of this study will help policy makers to adopt appropriate models of regional
collective action that are suitable and acceptable to specific localities. With proper
understanding of influence of local characteristics on metropolitan collective action,
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customized governance models will have a higher probability of success compared to
existing coercive methods.
This document is divided into six chapters. A brief explanation of the problem
and its background is provided in the introduction. Chapter two reviews the literature and
theoretical constructs regarding the subject matter. Chapter three explains the research
methods and develops hypotheses to be tested. Chapter four provides a summary of the
research findings. Chapter five provides discussion of the findings and chapter six lays
out research conclusions and identifies avenues for further research.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholars contend that regional governance in metropolitan areas is necessary to
reap the benefits of economy of scale in the provision of urban services. Regional
governance is more equitable due to standardization of area-wide policies and is able to
internalize policy spillovers—both positive and negative—across jurisdictional
boundaries. However, scholars have differences of opinion regarding appropriate paths to
regionalism. This chapter reviews arguments made in favor of polycentric, as well as
monocentric, organization of localities and governing metropolitan areas through
restructuring of metropolitan government versus non-structural metropolitan governance.
In conclusion, the chapter makes a logical move toward the need for metropolitan
governance through interlocal cooperation and identifies gaps in the literature in this
arena.

Divided Schools of Thought about Regional Collective Action
Throughout modern history, cities have adopted various regional measures to
solve local problems. According to Wallis, there have been three major waves of
regionalism (Wallis, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c). The first wave sought solutions at the local
level, generally by restructuring regional government through annexations and complete
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or partial consolidations. Most of the consolidation of large metropolises such as New
Orleans (1805), Boston (1821), Philadelphia (1854), San Francisco (1856), and New
York (1874-1898), took place in the nineteenth century, all of them by legislative action
(Wallis, 1994b). During the twentieth century, the main idea for local governmental
restructuring was based on a simple assumption that too many local governments reduced
the effectiveness of metropolitan governance, which needs to be replaced by consolidated
regional governments. The focus of those consolidations was to strengthen the regional
government by broadening the tax base to the greatest possible extent and to prevent
revenue loss caused by extra jurisdictional migration.
Proponents of the monocentric model of regional governance believe that urban
regions with a strong central government that are able to blanket the entire region with
standardized policies are better able to address urban problems compared to their
fragmented counterparts (Aron, 1969; Peirce, Johnson, & Hall, 1993; Rusk, 1993, 1999,
2003; Wood, 1961). Rusk uses the term “elastic” cities to define jurisdictions that are
able to expand their existing boundaries to encompass outlying communities so as to
bring the entire region under one policy umbrella. According to Wallis (1994), between
1950 and 1970 Atlanta quadrupled in size, Dallas and Fort Worth grew to more than
double their size, San Jose jumped from 17 to 140 square miles, and Phoenix expanded
from 17 to almost 250 square miles. Though most of these territorial expansions were a
result of major cities annexing unincorporated areas, a number of instances where smaller
independent cities consolidated with a neighboring major city have also been reported.
With the exceptions of Denver city – Denver County, Honolulu city – Honolulu County,
and the city and county of Broomfield (Colorado), all consolidations that took place in
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the twentieth century happened by referendum. Notably, between 1921 and 2010, there
were a total of 164 attempts of city-county consolidations of which voters approved only
thirty four (Murphy, 2012). Even with a success rate of just about 20 percent, proponents
of consolidation still believe it is the most appropriate model of regional governance
(Carver, 1973; Filer & Kenny, 1980; Foster, Gonzalez, & Chappell Jr., 1981; Gorton,
1978; B. W. Hawkins, Ward, & Becker, 1991; Leland & Thurmaier, 2000; S. M. Leland
& Thurmaier, 2010; Lyons & Lowery, 1989; Peirce et al., 1993; Rosentraub, 2000; Rusk,
1993, 1999). They tend to focus more on benefits of coordinated and equitable services
and enhanced regional economic competitiveness.
As with the case presented by Wallis (1994b), most of the late eighteenth-century
and early and mid–nineteenth-century approaches to regionalism was more about
centralization as a response to fragmentation. An ideal situation according to
consolidationists would be a unified regional government with area-wide powers.
However, supporters of monocentric models also agree that such an ideal situation is far
from reality. This explains their continued support for incomplete consolidations, partial
mergers, and other forms of multitier restructuring (Norris, 2001; Orfield, 1997a). Norris
(2001) paints a gloomier picture of American metropolitics believing that localities will
continue to fragment and urban problems will continue to exacerbate in the foreseeable
future without any possible resolution. Norris (2001) argues that state and federal
intervention may be necessary to create a multi-tiered formally structured government to
deal with some issues.
Difficulty in achieving consolidated regional governments through referendums is
probably the reason behind many reform scholars advocating for state and federal
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intervention on local issues. Wallis (1994b) calls it the second wave of regionalism.
Massive

influx

of

federal

money

for

infrastructure

development—primarily

transportation—and mandatory requirements for regional planning and coordinated areawide development brought federally brokered institutions like Council of Governments
(COGs) and Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) into the regional limelight.
Despite having an undertone of regional-type institution, they had a fragmented corestructure made up of local representatives coerced for forced collaboration. Competition
for federal grants soon rekindled rivalry among participating localities.
By the 1990s while some reform scholars had given up on metropolitan
regionalism because of numerous failed consolidation attempts and increasing
fragmentation due to local autonomy (Norris, 2001), others were busy evaluating
outcomes of various reform experiments that took place in the last century. Metropolitan
consolidation and multi tiered reform are the flagship models of the old regionalism.
Over the period of the last four decades, scholars have studied these models to examine
their effectiveness. Most of them report little or no achievement of the promised
outcomes (Benton & Gamble, 1984; Blomquist & Parks, 1995; Brierly, 2004; Carr, Bae,
& Lu, 2006; Carr & Feiock, 1999; Clarke, 2006; Feiock, 2004; Feiock & Carr, 1997;
Hutcheson & Prather, 1979; Reese, 2004; Rogers & Lipsey, 1974; Savitch & Vogel,
2000, 2004; Seamon & Feiock, 1995; Selden & Campbell, 2000).
Feiock (2004) claims that city-county consolidations fail to produce the intended
results due to the compromises made in order to pass the consolidation initiative. These
compromises often stripped away the basic powers needed to address inequity. Similarly,
Brierly (2004) claims that government centralization through consolidation simply
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increases transaction costs both within and between local governments. This argument is
further supported by Savitch and Vogel (2000). They concluded that the functional
linkages between localities in the Louisville metropolitan region (before consolidation)
created an environment of mutual trust that was necessary for collective action. They did
not expect localities to be trusting and respectful of each other if any form of
consolidation was forced on them.
Reformists generally claim improvement in fiscal health, better economic
conditions, benefits due to economy of scale, standardization and efficiency in service
provision, responsive governments, and improvement in quality of life as possible
outcomes of local government reform. They provide a strong theoretical argument that
consolidated governments should improve local conditions; but those hypotheses are
rarely quantitatively supported (Gorton, 1978; Hawkins et al., 1991; Leland &
Thurmaier, 2010; Rosentraub, 2000). Leland and Thurmaier (2000) contend that
consolidation improves fiscal health and budgetary accountability based on their study of
Kansas City and Wyandotte County, but the analytical underpinnings do not seem
sufficient and strong. Kelly and Adhikari (2013), using a time-series information on
Louisville and Jefferson County find marginal improvement in fiscal health as a result of
consolidation.
Claims about benefits of consolidation in service provision through scale
economy and better citizen responsiveness (Carver, 1973; Foster et al., 1981; Lyons &
Lowery, 1989) are yet to be quantitatively supported. According to the study done by
Hutcheson and Prather (1979), with the increase in size of the regional government
comes an inflated bureaucracy that makes scale economies unlikely. In fact Carver’s
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claim about government–responsiveness using a citizen survey done just five years after
the consolidation of Jacksonville city and Duval county might have been a little too early
to provide a realistic picture.
Governmental reforms have been found to shake things up in the first few years of
change. Reese (2004) argues that even though consolidation might stir up the regional
economy in the beginning, it fails to create lasting and noticeable change to an average
voter. A citizen survey carried out (after twelve years of consolidation) in a small town
outside Nashville City-Davidson County and a comparable neighborhood within the
urban services district showed considerably higher satisfaction with the local government
in the small town than in the urban-service district (Rogers & Lipsey, 1974).
Another argument popular among reformists is the reduction of fragmentation,
uniformity of taxes, and lowering of government expenditures as a result of
consolidation. However, Benton and Gamble (1984) provide quantitative evidence that
there was no reduction in property taxes or expenditures even after fifteen years of the
consolidation of city of Jacksonville and Duval County. On a similar note, Blomquist and
Parks (1995) report little evidence of reduction in taxing units as well as in complexity of
governmental structure even after twenty four years of Indianapolis City-Marion County
consolidation.
There are similar failure stories on the economic-development front as well.
Seamon and Feiock (1995), Feiock and Carr (1997; 1999) find no effect of the
Jacksonville-Duval consolidation on its economic development. Similarly, Carr et al.
(2006) found no effect of consolidation on economic growth when they compared data
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from consolidated Lexington City-Fayette County with that of Louisville City-Jefferson
County before their consolidation in 2003.
Consolidationists also claim that the reform models are better able to achieve
fiscal redistribution across urban regions. It is theorized that monocentric reform brings
localities under a common policy umbrella thus allowing for easy revenue transfers and
expenditures on redistributive programs. Consolidation is also suggested to be a primary
vehicle for transferring wealth from suburbs to the city (Filer & Kenny, 1980; Rusk,
2003). However, Blomquist and Parks (1995) have found little evidence of financial
redistribution through more than twenty years after the birth of Indianapolis Unigov.
Forced redistribution is probably a weakness rather than strength of consolidation.
Scholars have reported further migration of residents into outer suburbs and leapfrogging
exurbs as a result of such policies (Barnes & Ledebur, 1998; Downs, 1994). The regional
government cannot exercise its power of “elasticity” quick enough to engulf new border
towns. Some metropolitan regions have waited decades to get public mandate for
consolidated governments. This simply suggests that consolidation attempts are not
popular among voters and they spur new extra jurisdictional development at the
perimeter, thus aggravating the problem it was designed to resolve.
Besides its failure to keep its promises, scholars have reported local governmental
reform to be strongly associated with reduced citizen participation in local decision
making. Seamon and Feiock (1995) have reported reduced voter participation in local
elections after the Jacksonville-Duval consolidation. On a similar note, Clarke (2006)
also reported dilution of minority political power resulting from Louisville-Jefferson
County consolidation.
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Regionalism through Cooperation and Coordination
The examples presented in the previous section are sufficient to make a case that
regionalism through local governmental reform is an expensive and a laborious exercise
in vain. It is not very difficult to see why scholarly attention shifted from structure to
process, from governing to capacity building, and from government to governance
(Wallis, 1994c). Tiebout had already provided a strong explanation of regional
fragmentation through the application of micro-economic theory on urban localities
(Tiebout, 1956). This led to an understanding that fragmentation and segregation are the
result of self-sorting populations based on their likes and wants. Reformists’ claim about
achieving economy of scale through governmental consolidation came under theoretical
scrutiny when Ostrom et al. (1961) argued that scale economies for different urban
services are obtained at different levels. Therefore, an area-wide consolidation might not
always be the most efficient way of governing an urban region. With the distinction
between production and provision units (ACIR, 1987), various urban services could be
(theoretically) unbundled and different levels of scale economy could be realized. This
distinction allowed urban governance to be viewed more as a self-organizing local public
economy (Oakerson, 1999; Parks & Oakerson, 1989) than a random crazy-quilt bunch of
fiercely competing local governments.
Parks and Oakerson suggest that regionalism is better achieved through
cooperation and coordination among already existing local governments rather than
creating area-wide structures. Wherever necessary, localities can choose to create
functionally cross-cutting regional bodies with specific responsibilities. Encouraging
cooperation on pressing urban issues and creating local networks between existing
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governmental institutions have been suggested as the most appropriate and the easiest
paths to regional governance (Feiock, 2009; Savitch & Vogel, 2000; Walker, 1987).
Savitch and Vogel call this phenomenon new-regionalism.
The failure stories of old regionalism were probably the final nails in the coffin,
which renewed scholarly interest in cooperative governance through voluntary
participation of urban governments. Consolidated governments are getting internally
fragmented as they embark upon creating new independent public authorities such as in
the cases of Jacksonville and Indianapolis Unigov (Savitch & Vogel, 1996). Savitch and
Vogel also claim that despite having area-wide powers, consolidated governments avoid
introducing harsh policies to avoid public outcry. Hence, much is left for localities to
decide for themselves, to which localities have responded by cooperating and
coordinating in the least controversial ways (Savitch &Vogel,1996).
Of the seventeen different variants of regional collective action listed by Walker
(1987), methods that require governmental reform populate the tough end of the spectrum
while regional approaches to urban-service delivery through informal cooperation,
interlocal service contracts, and joint power agreements are considered to be the easiest
ones. On a similar note, Savitch and Vogel (2000) introduce the Linked Function model
and Complex Networks model as closest realization to governance without government.
Linked function is described as a form of functional consolidation through
interlocal service agreements in which a city and its county can mutually choose to
delegate specific functions such as economic development or waste disposal, to be
governed in an area-wide basis. Governments can also add or remove more functions
through mutual agreements to include revenue sharing or for other forms of redistribution
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as applicable to them. This model allows for local governments to maintain their
autonomy on certain policy issues while collaborating on others.
While the linked function model assumes regional fragmentation as something
that needs to be addressed through seemingly partial consolidation, the complex networks
model considers fragmentation to be the cause to increase potential for cooperative
governance. According to Savitch and Vogel, a large number of independent local
governments can voluntarily cooperate through multiple overlapping networks of
interlocal agreements. This complex web of cooperation allows for numerous service
arrangements of various types to choose from while maintaining citizen control over each
one of them. This model calls for a self-organizing and organic form of governance. Also
known as complex arrays, this model consists of provision units such as municipalities,
townships, counties, and special districts together with public authorities, and private
contractors forming a local public economy (ACIR, 1987).
However, skeptics of these models believe that regionalism through cooperative
governance can never be successful because of one simple reason: independent localities
might just stop cooperating thus removing the parameter that the entire model is based on
(Norris, 2001). Norris also points to the practical difficulties faced by localities when
their governing officials are replaced and they need to engage in negotiations again.
Savitch and Vogel (2000) themselves agree that self-direction may lead to no direction
and localities might revert back to maintaining the status quo.
Theories on cooperation, however, suggest that localities will cooperate as long as
conditions for cooperation are met (Axelrod, 1984; Williamson, 1979); hence skepticism
about continued cooperation or the future of cooperative networks is irrelevant.
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Anticipating for the stability of interlocal networks undermine the randomness and
organic character of interlocal cooperation as suggested by the complex networks model.
As long as conditions for cooperation are met, localities will cooperate. However, if
conditions are not favorable and collective action needs to be forced on them
(presumably by a third party), it is equivalent to reverting to the reform model through
formation of some form of institutionalized regional government.

Conditions for Interlocal Cooperation
Theories on interlocal relationships emphasize certain conditions that encourage
and ensure interlocal cooperation. According to Olson (1971), Axelrod (1984), and later
Coleman (1990), the first step toward cooperation is the realization that benefits from
such endeavors exist. It is easier to realize collective benefits in urban services requiring
large-scale investments such as solid-waste disposal and waste-water treatment, or assetspecific seasonal services such as snow removal and road maintenance; however, mutual
benefits are not easily visible in issues related to land uses, parks and recreation, and tax
policies. That is probably why skeptics of cooperative governance are concerned that
interlocal cooperation is achieved easily in “systems maintenance” services but not in
“lifestyle” services (Howell-Moroney, 2008; Norris, 2001; Williams, 1967). Norris
(2001) even argues that the way localities avoid cooperating on pressing lifestyle issues
resulting from fragmentation is the primary weakness of governance without government.
Recent studies have shown that localities within an urban region are dependent on each
other (Oakerson, 1999, 2004), and that the economies of central cities and suburbs are
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interrelated. Suburbs cannot thrive if their corresponding central cities are withering
(Savitch et al., 1993; Savitch & Vogel, 2004).
Reciprocity is another condition for successful cooperation. According to Axelrod
(1984), individuals (and probably institutions too) tend to reciprocate the behavior of
their opponents under conditions of uncertainty. It takes repeated interactions with the
same partners to build trust between the parties. Since urban jurisdictions are
geographically fixed, both the conditions for repeat interactions and fixed partners are
satisfied. Hawkins and Feiock (n.d.) also substantiate the theory of reciprocity with their
finding that prior agreements between localities influence future cooperative actions.
Transaction-cost theory is the key to understanding cooperation among localities.
As speculated by Norris (2001), some localities might not want to cooperate with others
or even end a cooperative relationship. When involved parties unilaterally pursue
defection to promote or protect their self-interest in an environment of distrust is what
Williamson (1993) refers to as opportunism. A mutual contract requires parties to fulfill
certain promises, and each participant bears some amount of risk that stems from other
collaborators not fulfilling their part of the promise. According to Coleman, the risk is
warranted as long as one expects gains by doing so, and that a decision to take such risk
implies that the parties trust one another (Coleman, 1990). Besides the costs arising from
individual behavior, cooperation is also dependent on the cost of production and
management of goods and services mutually (Commons, 1931). According to Coase
(1960) and Williamson (1979), localities compare the cost of in-house production of
urban services with that of joint production, and as long as joint production is cheaper
they engage in cooperation. As well as the cost of production, localities face other types
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of transaction costs such as the cost of finding parties, the cost of negotiating agreements,
and the cost of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the agreement (Macher &
Richman, 2008). Additionally, public-sector transaction-costs involve time and effort
devoted to making collective decisions, costs of elections and meetings, citizen
participation, and time required for official action (Oakerson, 1999). When these costs
are much higher, as Norris (2001) points out, it is difficult for localities to engage in a
collective action.
Monoentrists argue that reform models involve less transaction costs among
localities since they do not rely on mutual trust between them. Scholars suggest formation
of embedded networks among local units that are enforced through social, economic, and
political relationships to reduce transaction costs arising from distrust and risk aversion
(Feiock, In Won Lee, Hyung Jun Park, & Lee, 2010; Lee, Feiock, & Lee, 2012). This
suggests that social, economic, and political characteristics of localities have some
influence over their decision to cooperate with one another. The following section
summarizes the theories and the scholarly works pertaining to the influence of local
characteristics on interlocal cooperation.

Cooperation and Local Characteristics
The theory of cooperation puts special emphasis on characteristics of the parties
involved, and the nature of the environment they all operate within. Axelrod (1984)
suggests that fixed characteristics of participants are associated with certain stereotypical
behaviors. He calls them labels. Similarly, participants develop a reputation over time
that can encourage or hinder cooperation. Localities get labelled in various ways, which
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eventually become their identity. Rich and poor; high class, middle class, and poor
neighborhoods; white neighborhoods and black neighborhoods; city and suburb,
downtown and uptown, and the like. In the United States, city centers have been
conventionally pictured as having higher concentration of blacks, poor whites, and
working-class migrants. Central-city residential areas also connote higher instances of
boarded-up houses, run-down neighborhoods, decaying, old industrial infrastructure,
poor-quality urban services, poor-quality schools, drug addiction, crime, and the like,
whereas central city business centers suggest a picture of a high-rise skyline with
gleaming, glass-clad office buildings, hotels, convention centers, and the like.
Suburbs, on the other hand, have an image of having lower population densities
with large single family houses, clean environment, higher percentage of whites, more
educated and highly skilled workforce, higher incomes, better schools, nice parks, and
less crime. Such variations in characteristics affect cooperation among localities.
Neighboring cities with similar population characteristics are likely to have common
preferences for public services, and therefore are comfortable collaborating with
localities they perceive as compatible types.
Localities easily build trust with other localities with similar characteristics and
preferences. According to Axelrod, a certain reputation is attached to various labels. In an
urban context, African-American neighborhoods have reputations for harboring crime,
poverty, drug addiction, and other socially unacceptable activities. Similarly, poor, black,
or migrant communities are considered to demand more public services and pay fewer
taxes. These groups are also considered to put additional stress on the health-care system
and redistributive social programs. Thus well-endowed localities are unlikely to engage

25

in cooperation with their needy neighbors. Axelrod (1984), however, implies that
characteristically different localities can also engage in cooperation if they build up
sufficient trust through repeat interactions and consistent good behavior.
Besides drawing from the general theories of cooperation, urban literature is
rather lean on theories explaining the effects of local characteristics on urban interlocal
cooperation. Probably the first influential work on interlocal relations is Tiebout’s theory
of local expenditure (Tiebout, 1956). This is, however, a model of population sorting and
interlocal competition rather than a model for cooperation. Models of cooperation
between fragmented localities are explained by ACIR (1985, 1987), Parks and Oakerson
(1989), and Oakerson (1999, 2004). These studies suggest group size (fragmentation)
possibly influences interlocal cooperation. Oakerson (2004) and Post (2004b), building
on the work of Olson (1971), argues that the transaction cost of interlocal cooperation
increases with increasing group size. As the number of localities in a region increase,
transaction costs–the cost of organization and operation–also increases. Increasing
number of participants in regional collective action encourages some to free-ride on
collective benefits. However, Oakerson (2004) believes that communities that are unable
to build sufficient mutual trust and those unable to overcome the problems of free riding
are the candidates for consolidation.
In addition to group size, territorial proximity is another factor that affects
interlocal cooperation. Axelrod (1984) posits that territorially proximate neighbors
interact more, and successful strategies spread to other subsequent jurisdictions.
Sometimes it might be necessary for a locality to imitate certain policies adopted by its
neighbor(s) to prevent cross-border spillover. For example, different zoning and tax
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policies adopted by two neighboring localities might encourage residents and businesses
to strategically move across jurisdictions to gain respective benefits provided by both.
Tax-sharing covenants or cooperatively adopted local policies will render any strategic
behavior by the residents unnecessary. Eventually neighboring communities may face
similar problems and be forced to adopt similar policies. This is only true if these
localities are characteristically similar and people are indifferent about choosing where to
live (or run their businesses). Even though neighboring localities have different capacities
for production and provision of urban services, proximity makes it possible for
neighboring localities to jointly produce certain urban services and enjoy efficiency
through scale economy. Post (2002) has reported increased probability of local
cooperation where local government densities are higher.
Size and proximity are much simpler characteristics when it comes to interlocal
relations. Parks and Oakerson (1989) and Oakerson (1999) limit their arguments to these
physical characteristics when discussing variations between localities participating in the
local public economy. However, localities have a differing mix of economic, social, and
political characteristics that dictate how much capacity and willingness they have to
contribute to the ecosystem of regional governance. Few theories are established about
how localities having different characteristics cooperate with one other. Probably the
closest proxy would be to use the theories of segregation, assuming that the reasons
forcing localities to segregate are the reasons preventing them from cooperating.
Research in the field is fairly consistent that localities segregate because of difference in
preferences, which reflect lifestyle choices as well as economic capacities. People
segregate into different jurisdictions according to their economic classes, racial
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differences, and political choices. Suburban localities are generally wealthy, and city
centers are generally poor. Wealthy localities have better schools and better employment
opportunities, while poor localities do not. Poverty, lack of infrastructure, and lack of
opportunities gradually convert poorer localities into crime pockets. The more this
happens, the more families move to the suburbs and the suburbs become more segregated
from their central cities (Burns, 1994; Downs, 1994; Ledebur & Barnes, 1992; Nivola,
1999). It is logical to assume that local characteristics such as economic condition, fiscal
capacity, incomes, poverty levels, education levels, racial mix, and political choices
influence the way localities interact. In the next section, relevant scholarly works on local
characteristics and interlocal cooperation are discussed along with their strengths and
shortcomings.

Scholarly Research on Local Characteristics and Interlocal Cooperation
Intergovernmental relations as a field of research came into the spotlight after the
establishment of Advisory Commission for Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) in 1959.
Interests in local government interactions became prominent when ACIR started
conducting custom surveys of local characteristics. Initially, the studies were more
aligned

towards

city-suburban

divide,

metropolitan

fragmentation,

economic

development, and income inequalities. This scholarly field is still very young compared
to economics, political science, and other social sciences. Among different streams of
local governmental research, studies of local interactions share its platform with literature
on economic development, policy analysis, and public administration. This body of
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literature focuses on local competitiveness, economic growth, and fiscal capacity as well
as race relations, inequalities, and political characteristics.

Studies on Fragmentation and Interlocal Cooperation
Fragmentation is perhaps the most studied topic by scholars of local collective
action. Fragmentation by itself is not a local characteristic; it is a representation of
jurisdictional proliferation in a region. However, higher fragmentation represents greater
diversity of preferences for public policies in the region. When regions fragment,
localities of various characteristics sort themselves within the regional geography, and
then engage in cooperation and competition on various policy issues. Fragmentation has
been theorized to create the potential for, as well as, hinder interlocal cooperation. As
urban fragmentation is caused due to self-sorting of residents into their preferred
jurisdictions, localities naturally assume competition with one another. However,
fragmentation also increases the probability of cooperation by enlarging the pool of
potential collaborators in the region.
Post (2002) finds negative effects of regional fragmentation on interlocal
cooperation. She uses the number of local governments per 10,000 people as a measure
of fragmentation and the event-count of interlocal monetary transfers to measure
interlocal cooperation. Such an event-count records number of instances of interlocal
transfers–revenue as well as expenditure–as a measure of cooperation. This method of
measurement does not provide information about the scale of cooperative engagement. A
single instance of a large sum of monetary transfer between localities might be larger
than several instances of transfers of smaller amounts. While each instance is counted as
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one unit of cooperation irrespective of the amount of money involved, the measure does
not accurately represents the extent of cooperative activities between localities.
Other studies have also reported a negative impact of fragmentation on interlocal
cooperation. Olberding (2002b) finds a higher degree of fragmentation and competition
correlates to a lesser degree of regional cooperation in economic development. Post and
Stein (2000) find no impact of fragmentation on regional economic interdependence.
Rawlings (2003) also reports no significant causal relationship between fragmentation
and metropolitan-area collective action. Likewise, Hawkins (2010), reports lower
probability of cooperation when metropolitan areas are highly fragmented. Kwon and
Feiock (2010) also report a negative correlation between fragmentation and interlocal
cooperation for the delivery of urban services.
Fragmentation of urban regions also implies that jurisdictional boundaries overlap
among different general-purpose and special-purpose local governments. Parks and
Oakerson (1993) find such overlaps to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation. On a
similar note, Johnson and Neiman (2004) report findings from a survey carried out
among local administrators that localities cooperate in economic development initiatives
even when majority of them see one another as competitors.
Krueger (2006), while measuring interlocal cooperation in terms of interlocal
revenue transfer per capita and fragmentation as number of governments per capita,
presents an inconclusive finding regarding the relation of fragmentation and interlocal
cooperation.
These studies use a variety of methods to operationalize their variables, which
could be one reason for discrepancy in their findings. Johnson and Neiman use survey
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data in which respondents are asked if they identify their neighboring localities as
competitors. Hawkins (2010) uses a per capita measure of fragmentation and a
dichotomous measure of interlocal cooperation. Kwon and Feiock (2010) also generate a
binomial measure of interlocal cooperation by asking city administrators whether they
have considered pursuing joint delivery of urban services with their neighbors.
Literature presents an indecisive picture regarding the relation between
metropolitan fragmentation and interlocal cooperation. As identified by many scholars
(Hawkins, 2010; Krueger, 2006; Post, 2002), fragmentation does seem to work as a
double-edged sword. Analysis using large scale aggregated data is needed to find a
conclusive answer.

Studies on Local Economic Condition and Interlocal Cooperation
Fragmentation creates localities with discrete preferences, resources, and
capacities for collective action. Lee and Feiock (2012) shed some light on unequal needs,
resources, and inequities in power and accountability between localities. They suggest
that localities that share similar socioeconomic attributes and political institutions are
more likely to create linkages with each other as they are more likely to share economic
development agendas and policy preferences. They conducted a survey among select
residents in the Orlando-Kissimmee metropolitan region to substantiate their theory.
Economy, economic strength, and economic competitiveness are perhaps the most
discussed terminologies in regionalism literature. This is the most common and apolitical
topic of interest for both the reformists and the revisionists. Economic weakness can
force a locality to seek partners in service delivery and infrastructure development.
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Elected officials of fiscally weak localities have been reported to advocate for annexation
bills expecting to improve the economic condition of their governments (Rusk, 1993).
Others have also identified the fiscal state of localities as a primary impetus for interlocal cooperation (Downs, 1994; Ferris & Graddy, 1986; Foster, 1997; Haughwout,
1999; Heeg et al., 2003; Sonenblum et al., 1977).
Fiscal capacity of a local government impacts the quality of public services they
can provide to their citizens and also influences the ability to access capital markets to
improve infrastructure. A study focused on a five-county region of Southern California
reported a greater probability of outsourcing municipal services by fiscally stressed
localities (Joassart-Marcelli & Musso, 2005). Other studies show that cities with a higher
tax burden per capita are more inclined toward contracting out their public services to
neighboring governments or private agencies (LeRoux & Carr, 2007; Morgan, Hirlinger,
& England, 1988). Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) measure local fiscal pressure in terms of
the percentage of local revenue from federal and state government sources and show a
positive but feeble correlation with inter-local cooperation. Some other studies, however,
find local fiscal health to be an insignificant factor in inter-local cooperation decisions
(Chen & Thurmaier, 2009; Feiock & Park, 2005). The difference in results can be
attributed to the difference in methodology employed by the researchers.
Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) use interval-level information that measures
magnitude of interlocal cooperation, whereas Chen and Thurmaier (2009) use discrete
measure of instances of cooperative agreements. Chen and Thurmaier’s (2009) measure
of fiscal health and its influence on cooperation is based on a survey questionnaire that
asks city managers if they find it to be a substantial impetus. They do not explain what
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measures were taken to standardize the responses and control for biases; they use a
relatively small sample of data, and their coefficient does not attain statistical
significance. Similarly, Feiock and Park

(2005) use percent of revenues from the

locality’s own sources to measure fiscal health. While it is a reliable metric, it could have
generated different results if a scalar measure of interlocal cooperation was used.
Hawkins (2010) reports that fiscal stress of a locality negatively impacts the
probability for joint venture. This study uses a binomial dependent variable that reports at
least one instance of collaboration. He measures fiscal stress as long-term debt per capita.
This metric has an endogenous relation with the dependent variable. Localities with
higher debts per capita are not good candidates for a joint venture in economic
development because they have a bad credit rating and are difficult to trust. Besides, long
–term debt does not accurately assess a locality’s fiscal capacity as localities experiencing
high economic growth have better credit scores and have easier access to long-term debts.
Another weakness of that study is the use of employment in the manufacturing sector to
measure local economy. In the present state of urban deindustrialization and rise of the
service economy, it is perhaps not the best measure of economic vitality.
Even if localities are enjoying good fiscal health, large-scale public goods and/or
goods characterizing high asset specificity are difficult for small communities to produce.
When local governments need to invest in specialized equipment and human resources,
they generally seek a partnership with their neighbors to share costs (Brown & Potoski,
2003). Fiscally stressed and economically declining localities are not alone in seeking
partners. Liebman et al. (1963) report localities with thriving economies seeking
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partnerships with localities having comparable economic conditions. This is an old study
and needs to be reexamined using current data.
Metropolitan status, larger population base, higher per capita income, and higher
job-growth rate are all accepted signs of a healthy economy. Localities with an
economically sound tax-paying population have an increased financial capacity for
investing in large infrastructure than their surrounding smaller suburban localities. They
also have easier access to credit markets. It seems less likely that those localities would
seek partners for cooperation (Foster, 1997). However, economically sound localities are
also found to cooperate when there are possibilities of cost reduction and efficiency gains
through scale economy (Heeg et al., 2003).
Cities with declining economies—those facing reduction in employment
opportunities; reduction in income; outmigration of skilled labor; and higher percentage
of low income and needy residents—can be expected to pursue cooperation in delivery of
urban services as well as economic growth. A number of scholarly works support this
hypothesis (Feiock & Park, 2005; Foster, 1997; LeRoux & Carr, 2007; Olberding, 2002a;
Orfield, 1997b). However, Lubell et al. (2002) found per capita income to be positively
correlated with the likelihood of cooperation. These variations in findings can be
attributed to small sample size, methods of measuring variables, and research methods
used. Feiock and Park (2005), and LeRoux and Carr (2007) examine the relationships
within a small region using dichotomous dependent variables, whereas Olberding (2002a)
uses a numerical count of regional partnerships within select metropolitan regions. Both
methods of measurement fail to reflect the magnitude of cooperation. A sufficiently large
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nationwide study using a scalar measure of cooperation will provide a more generalizable
conclusion.
Age and the size of the economy are other variables that influence the behavior of
a locality. Older cities have outdated service infrastructures that require considerable
investment to modernize. Those cities are more inclined to cooperate either to
compensate for insufficient in-house production or to expand their service area for more
revenue. On the contrary, older cities that already have the necessary infrastructure
required to produce their services in-house are less interested in seeking partners. A
recent study found that older, highly developed communities with large populations favor
direct provision of services (LeRoux & Carr, 2007) and that newly incorporated cities
relied more on outsourcing of services (Joassart-Marcelli & Musso, 2005). On the
contrary, another study found no difference between decisions to provide services
externally between industrial and postindustrial cities (Brown & Potoski, 2003). Brown
and Potoski (2003) also carried out a deeper analysis on the size of the economy where
they found that large cities within a metropolitan area mostly produce their services inhouse. However, cities outside metropolitan areas are found to seek external sources of
service production. On a similar note Joassart-Marcelli & Musso (2005) find smaller
suburban cities to be more inclined toward outsourcing their urban services.

Studies on Social Characteristics and Interlocal Cooperation
Racial mixes and the average age of residents have been theorized to impact local
intergovernmental relations. Localities are thought to have tendencies to racially
homogenize. In fact, preference for racial segregation is considered a good reason for the
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formation of new local governments (Burns, 1994). Communities eager to maintain racial
hegemony see interlocal cooperation as a threat to their control over local politics.
Savitch and Vogel (2000) report disinclination of minority African-American population
groups toward consolidation of Louisville City and Jefferson County. Likewise, Hamilton
(2004) reports aversion toward regional collective action in Chicago due to the presence
of incompatible racial pockets. Feiock and Park (2005) also report that racially
homogenous communities have a higher probability of engaging in cooperation for
economic development.
In another study, Hawkins and Feiock (n.d.) report a higher percentage of African
Americans show preference for interlocal cooperation in the delivery of urban services.
On the contrary, Lubell et al. (2002) report racial homogeneity measured in terms of the
percentage of African-American and Hispanic populations to be negatively correlated
with the probability of local partnerships, while LeRoux and Carr (2007) cite results that
are inconclusive on the role of race on inter jurisdictional cooperation.
Based on the literature, it is difficult to conclude if race plays a positive or
negative role towards cooperation. Hamilton’s (2004) research uses examples such as
Chicago and Pittsburg that are historically known to have racial issues. LeRoux and
Carr’s (2007) study is also localized in a handful of counties in Michigan that are known
to have sharp racial segregation, but the paper stops short of discussing biases due to the
history of racial incompatibility. Probably economic and fiscal reasons are more
responsible than racial reasons. Perhaps Norris (2001) and Williams (1967) correctly
theorized that racially motivated localities cooperate in the issues of service delivery but
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avoid collaborating in policy issues to maintain their political control. Further research is
needed to conclusively generalize localities’ behavior on this issue.
Interlocal cooperation is also affected by the demographic composition of the
localities. Literature finds mixed influence of the senior population and the population
approaching retirement on interlocal cooperation. Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) report
that higher percentage of senior population in localities is correlated with less cooperation
among localities. They argue that senior people are less open to changes in service
delivery mechanism. Joassart-Marcelli and Musso (2005) also find that urban services are
more privatized in cities with lower percentage of elderly population. LeRoux and Carr
(2007), however, report that localities with higher percentage of senior population
cooperate more on joint production of expensive urban utilities. They argue that elderly
population have higher demand for cheaper public services and they prefer mechanisms
that promises to lower costs of producing them.

Studies on Geographic Proximity and Interlocal Cooperation
Geographic proximity with neighbors allows localities to easily reap benefits from
scale economy. Studies have suggested that when local governments are geographically
near to one another, they can be expected to collaborate more often for infrastructure and
services than when they are far apart (Feiock, 2007; Post, 2002). Local governments are
inclined to cooperate not only in joint production of urban services, but also on common
regional problems when they are closer. As distances between localities decrease, policy
externalities easily spill over across boundaries and it is in the best interest of the
localities to engage in collective action to internalize them (Peirce et al., 1993).
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Public goods are territorial in nature, and they can only be consumed by users in
and around the locality where they are produced. At the same time, it is much easier to
jointly produce and consume local services in collaboration with a contiguous neighbor
than with a noncontiguous one. Territorially integrated neighbors have been suggested to
engage in service cooperation more easily than neighbors that are farther away (Heeg et
al., 2003). Post (2002) uses government density as a measure of proximity and reports
that the geographic density of localities in the metropolitan regions is significantly and
positively related to the incidence of local intergovernmental agreements. This study uses
a sufficiently large sample size but fails to measure the magnitude of interlocal
cooperation. Minkoff (2012) uses a probabilistic method using a binomial measure of
interlocal cooperation and finds that geographic proximity positively correlates with
cooperation among local governments. This study is based on the data collected from
selected localities in Denver and does not have sufficient sample size needed for
generalization of findings.

Studies on Geographic Location and Interlocal Cooperation
Location of a jurisdiction near the city center compared to the suburbs also affects
their characteristics. Most literature portray sharp racial and economic differences
between central and suburban localities, and paint a compelling picture of city-suburban
animosity, which rules out the possibility for cooperation (Hamilton, 2004; Peirce et al.,
1993). However, studies that isolate the effects of location, controlling for other socioeconomic characteristics, have mixed conclusions. Controlling for the effects of
population size, Brown and Potoski (2003) find that governments located in metropolitan
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areas have higher probability to joint contracting for service delivery. On the contrary,
another study found that suburban localities, in general, are more engaged in cooperative
measures for service production than those in the central city (Joassart-Marcelli &
Musso, 2005). Theory, however, suggests that proximate localities can reap benefits
easily irrespective of their sizes. Rawlings (2003), on the other hand, reports no influence
of central location on cooperative endeavors.

Need for This Study
The literature related to local intergovernmental relations paint an encouraging
picture of scholarly interest in this research area. A number of diverse scholarly articles
touch on the context of the relationship between local characteristics and local
cooperation. Some of those studies are focused solely on cooperation for economic
development; some primarily examine city-suburb relations, and others focus on the role
of administrative structures. While some scholarly studies examine the influence of
selected local characteristics on a locality’s ability and preference for cooperation, most
of them are focused on spotting the existence of cooperative agreements rather than
measuring the scale and extent of cooperative endeavors.
A majority of studies use dichotomous measure of interlocal cooperation (Feiock
& Park, 2005; Ferris & Graddy, 1986; Hawkins & Feiock, n.d; Hawkins, 2010; Johnson
& Neiman, 2004; Kwon & Feiock, 2010; LeRoux & Carr, 2007; Minkoff, 2012). These
studies operationalize their dependent variable–measures of interlocal cooperation–in
terms of the existence of cooperative activity. Respondents are asked if their governments

39

have engaged in any form of cooperation within a time frame. This method of
measurement does not provide information about the magnitude of cooperative activity.
Weakness in measurement of the dependent variable is also associated with
studies that rely on the numerical count of interlocal contracts (Chen & Thurmaier, 2009;
Krueger, 2006; Lee et al., 2012; Olberding, 2002a; Post, 2002; Post & Stein, 2000).
Counting the number of interlocal contracts does not represent the amount of monetary
transaction. Additionally, interlocal contracts only represent formal cooperation among
localities while leaving out cooperation through informal handshake deals.
Other studies that provide compelling explanations about the relationship between
local characteristics and local cooperation, use very small sample data and are focused on
specific metropolitan areas. Their findings are intriguing but cannot be generalized. For
example, Johnson and Neiman (2004) limit their study to medium sized cities in the state
of California. Lee et al. (2012) focus on the Orlando-Kissimmee metropolitan area.
Similarly, Foster (1997) focuses on the Buffalo metropolitan region, and Jossart-Marcelli
and Musso (2005) limit their scope to a five-county Southern California region. Chen and
Thurmaier’s (2009) study is also limited to local governments in the state of Iowa.
Minkoff (2012) uses select cities in Colorado, while Hamilton (2004) focuses on Chicago
and Pittsburgh. This piecemeal approach to the study of local cooperation is probably
another reason for variations in their findings. Aggregate studies like the one by Krueger
(2006) is not directly focused on interlocal cooperation, and another by Ferris and Graddy
(1986) lacks currency. There is a need for a comprehensive and generalizable study that
can provide conclusive answers about the influence of local characteristics on interlocal
cooperation using aggregate data and a dependent variable that measures not only the
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instances of cooperation but also the magnitude. The following chapters demonstrate how
this can be accomplished.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH QUESTIONS, HYPOTHESES, AND METHODOLOGY

Research Question
Urban literature generally agrees that most prevailing urban problems are caused
by cost spillovers resulting from fragmentation and self-governance. Previous chapters
have shed light on the concept of governance without government as the most appropriate
model to resolve longstanding and pressing urban issues without imposing much
restriction on public choice and jurisdictional autonomy. Parks and Oakerson (1989)
introduced the idea of “local public economies” that explained how multiple overlapping,
and cross-cutting jurisdictions might organize themselves to reap benefits of scale
economy in service production as well as to resolve cross-border problems. Transactioncost theory provides a generic foundation for the understanding of any type of
cooperation among individuals and institutions. The literature suggests that localities both
in cities and suburbs need to work together to solve mutual problems, and it also tells
how obstacles to institutional collective action can be overcome through communication,
interaction, and joint ventures. Cities are competing and cooperating with their neighbors
at all times in various policy areas; and some localities cooperate more than others. The
most logical reason for the difference in level of cooperation among localities could be
that localities are characteristically different to begin with. Some localities are rich while
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others are poor, some have a higher capacity for service provision; some have numerous
internal problems and a high degree of fiscal stress; some have specific cultural
reputation; some have better resources; and some are more globally connected than
others. Also some are centers of commerce; some are manufacturing hubs while others
are bedroom communities. The literature does not provide a sufficient explanation for
how local characteristics influence the cooperative decisions of localities. This
manuscript strives to answer one question: Which local characteristics encourage
interlocal cooperation? The following section elaborates further on research questions
and constructs the hypotheses for this study.

Specific Research Questions and Hypotheses
This manuscript seeks to answer the following questions:
Q1: Does metropolitan fragmentation increase or decrease interlocal cooperation?
Q2: How does the variation in economic capacity between localities affect
interlocal cooperation?
Q3: How do the variations in social class, demographics, and race influence
interlocal cooperation?
Three research hypotheses are proposed to answer these questions.
H1: Localities in politically fragmented metropolitan regions and those in close
proximity to one another engage more in interlocal cooperation.
H2: Economic distress pushes localities to seek partners for cooperation.
H3: Homogenous racial and economic classes favor interlocal cooperation.
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The first hypothesis of this study focuses on urban fragmentation. Fragmentation
is the proliferation of local governments within urban regions. Miller et. al. (1995)
measures metropolitan fragmentation as the number of local governments—cities,
municipalities, townships, and special districts—per unit population. The presence of
more governments per capita simply signifies more preferential sorting within a region.
This also suggests an increase in the number of government units competing for limited
resources. Teibout (1956) suggests that localities within a fragmented region can only be
expected to compete with one another in order to provide attractive tax-services bundles
to targeted population. Peterson’s (1981) city-limits hypothesis also points toward a
competitive scenario between local governments with no room for cooperation. On the
other hand, Parks and Oakerson (1993) believe that fragmented localities can easily
engage in regionally integrative production structures. Feiock et al. (2004) suggest that
competition and cooperation can coexist. Hawkins and Feiock (n.d.) also claim that cities
have been found to cooperate even when competition is the generally accepted norm. The
argument that cities and suburbs are economically interlinked and their individual
prosperity is tied to the regional prosperity (Savitch et al., 1993) also suggests that
localities might cooperate for mutual benefits.
Olson’s (1971) theory on group sizes says that the more group size increases, the
more difficult it is to get individuals to cooperate because of the increase in the
transaction cost of enforcement and monitoring mutual agreements. This manuscript
argues that this logic does not apply to urban localities. Urban localities have fixed
geographies, and irrespective to the number of localities in the region, an individual
locality always has a fixed number of neighbors. In selected policy arenas such as the
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maintenance of air and water quality many non neighboring localities collaborate on
regional issues, but the geographically fixed nature of urban infrastructure and the effects
of local policies suggest that localities are concerned more about interacting with their
immediate neighbors. Therefore increased group size might not impact interlocal
cooperation in the way assumed by Olson’s theory. Rather, increased fragmentation
enables localities to capitalize on service provision capacities of their neighbors and
increases the potential for sharing as well as and minimizing risks. In consonance with
the theory suggested by Parks and Oakerson (1993), it is hypothesized that increasing
metropolitan fragmentation increases the possibility of interlocal cooperation.
Urban literature also suggests that fragmentation produces centrifugal forces,
creating new localities outside the city–generally in suburban areas, and sometimes even
further away in adjoining rural areas also known as exurban cities. Proximate neighbors
might share more across boundaries than others that are geographically separated. When
localities are too close to each other, service-production collaboration is easy to
materialize. In such a scenario, the policy effects are also difficult to contain within
jurisdictional boundaries. A shared local economy can easily blur jurisdictional lines and
create demand for complementary land uses. Proximate localities can easily realize
economies of scale by cooperating with their neighbors. Therefore, localities that are in
close proximity with their neighbors are expected to engage more in interlocal
cooperation.
The second hypothesis focuses on the effect of a local economy on interlocal
cooperation. Transaction-cost theory suggests that localities cooperate when it is less
expensive for them to engage in joint production (or provision) of urban services.
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Localities either count on economic benefits or have an economic need to engage in
cooperation. Economic benefit is realized when it is cheaper to produce services jointly.
Economic need arises when a locality is not able to continue to produce or provide
certain services and is forced to seek partners for service continuity.
The local economy can be viewed in two different ways: (1) by the economic
vitality of the locality in general, which is traditionally measured in terms of the wealth of
the residents, opportunities for employment, and the existence of a thriving commercial
sector; and (2) by the fiscal capacity of the governing institution, typically measured in
terms of revenue collected from local sources, the ability to maintain existing
infrastructure and develop new ones, and the capacity to pay off debts. Generally these
two aspects of a local economy are complementary. Wealthier residents, higher property
values, commercial, retail, and entertainment activities generate revenue for the
governing institution. As a result, the governing body has higher credit worthiness and
more accessibility to capital markets. It can then invest in more services, levy fewer
taxes, and further enhance the attractiveness of the area.
Economically thriving communities with better employment opportunities, higher
wages, and better living conditions can attract migrants from surrounding areas. By
employing zoning regulations and assigning land uses, localities can generally prevent
unwanted low-skilled, working-class residents from moving in permanently. They adopt
zoning regulations that favor high-end services and infrastructure to attract wealthy
residents from the surrounding area. Such in-migration puts pressure on infrastructure
and even though these localities have the capacity to invest in developmental activities,
they are not able to do it quickly enough to be commensurate with the rate of growth.
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Developmental activities require large investments, and localities seek ways to
minimize risks. One way to meet the increasing service demand and lower risk on
investment is to engage in partnership with neighboring localities. Localities can be
expected to engage in cooperation with neighbors that have a strong and stable economy.
Poorer neighbors generally have lower investment capacities and bad credit ratings. Any
joint venture with such localities would be a risky endeavor.
In contrast, economically distressed localities might find it much easier and more
effective to provide urban services to their residents by using cooperative means of
production. Poor localities cannot collect much revenue from property taxes as property
values are lower in their jurisdictions. Lower property values attract more poor people
from surrounding areas (most of them probably employed as unskilled labor in nearby
thriving localities). With a higher tax burden, lower tax capacity, and high demand for
urban services due to the influx of working-class people, such localities face tremendous
fiscal pressures. Probably they can ensure service continuity to their residents only by
cooperating or collaborating with neighboring localities.
The third hypothesis of this research focuses on the influence of racial and
economic classes on interlocal cooperation. Preferential sorting based on the social
characteristics of residents is another outcome of fragmentation. People also make
decisions about their residential location based on factors such as income levels and
racial identity. People prefer to live in localities where they are in the majority. Burns
(1994) claims that preference for racial segregation is the major reason for the formation
of new local governments. Similarly, Savitch and Vogel (2000) found that minority
groups were against the consolidation of Louisville city with Jefferson County due to the

47

fear of political dilution. Race and class are strongly correlated in most American
metropolitan areas. The extant literature on fragmentation and segregation suggests that
the white majority tends to segregate from blacks by migrating into the suburbs. As
suggested by the findings of Savitch and Vogel (2000) minority blacks also seek to
segregate from whites. While considering race as an independent factor, localities with
contrasting racial majorities are not expected to cooperate with each other. However,
racial segregation often implies economic segregation as well. In most localities, racial
minorities are also found to be poor, pay fewer taxes, and demand more services than
what they pay for (Downs, 1994; Ledebur & Barnes, 1992). These localities are generally
fiscally stressed and are better off cooperating with their neighbors irrespective of racial
attitudes.
Racial homogeneity has different meanings at different geographic scales. Higher
racial homogeneity of a metropolitan region implies that the localities within the region
are more likely to have similar racial makeup. In that case cooperation is comparatively
easy to achieve. Hence racially homogenous metropolitan regions are expected to
experience more aggregate interlocal cooperation.
Racial homogeneity of a locality represents its internal racial structure. Its
attitudes towards interlocal cooperation depend on the racial characteristics of its
neighbors. If the neighboring localities are also internally homogenous with a similar
racial majority, cooperation is easier between those localities. Conversely, two differently
homogenous neighboring localities might have difficulty cooperating because of racial
biases and distrust. The very fact that segregation is the result of the white flight, and the
African-Americans’ preference for a racial clout suggests that either racial majority at the
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local level does not approve of interlocal cooperation. Therefore localities with
contrasting racial majorities are not expected to engage in interlocal cooperation with one
another.
Seniors, retired, and a population nearing retirement comprise the demographic
segment that can be expected to have a contrasting attitude toward interlocal cooperation
compared to its occupationally active counterparts. These people often have less
disposable income and more per capita demand for urban services. They generally have
no other ideological biases except that they prefer to reside in inexpensive localities with
inexpensive services. Public service is more of a necessity than lifestyle preference for
this population group. They can be expected to vote for any service provision mechanism
that ensures availability and affordability of urban services for a long time.
The income class of the population is another variable explored in this
manuscript. Regions with higher levels of economic inequality can be expected to
experience lower levels of interlocal cooperation. Regional inequality implies that
residents of the localities in the region have sharp differences in income levels. Poor
communities might be better off cooperating with their wealthier neighbors, but wealthier
areas have less incentive to do the same. Cooperation cannot be expected in such an
environment that lacks reciprocity. Conversely, in regions with low income inequality, all
neighboring localities have similar economic characteristics, and therefore
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preferences for urban services. Economically homogenous regions can thus be expected
to experience more aggregate interlocal cooperation.
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Research Methodology
This study uses a multivariate quantitative method to examine the hypothesized
relationships. Descriptive statistics are used to show the magnitude of interlocal
cooperation and the extent of various local characteristics. Preliminary relationships are
studied using correlation matrices, followed by multivariate regression to identify the
direction and magnitude of the effects of various local characteristics on interlocal
cooperation. The dependent and independent variables, and the control parameters used
in this analysis are described in succeeding sections.

Units of Analysis
Local government, including counties, cities, and townships within the
metropolitan region, is the unit of analysis for this study. The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) defines metropolitan statistical areas as having at least one urbanized
area of 50,000 or more population, and adjacent territory that has a high degree of social
and economic integration with the core as measured by commuting ties. In this sense, a
metropolitan statistical area is the closest approximation of an economically linked urban
region. Whereas metropolitan areas represent the extent of an urban economic region,
localities are the building blocks of that region. Although special-purpose governments
such as special districts and public authorities also are functionally specific and crosscutting jurisdictions, this manuscript only uses general-purpose local governments for the
analysis. The rationale to limit the analysis only to general-purpose governments is first
that these units sufficiently represent an urban voting population and, second, they have
unique and non overlapping boundaries that make data comparison easier. This study
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uses relevant information of localities in 51 of the largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSA) in the country, selected on the basis of population size of one million or more per
the 2010 census count. Component counties for those metropolitan areas, and all sub
county-level local governments—cities, municipalities, and townships—are identified per
census designation and use the integrated government directory of the census of
governments. Selected socioeconomic, political, and geographic characteristics for
individual localities are gleaned from the census summary files and the American
community survey 5-year estimates. Quantitative analysis is carried out at both MSA as
well as local levels. Area-wide characteristics such as fragmentation and income
inequalities are appropriately measured across localities at the MSA levels, whereas
economic and social variations are measured at both local and regional scale for the
purpose of comparison.

Variables and Measures
Interlocal Cooperation (Dependent Variable)
Interlocal cooperation refers to any form of cooperative activities between
county, city or municipality, and township governments. According to the census bureau
the term municipal government refers to political subdivisions within which a municipal
corporation has been established to provide general local government for a specific
population concentration in a defined area, and includes all active government units
officially designated as cities, boroughs (except in Alaska), towns (except in six New
England States, and in Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin), and villages 2. Township
governments are mostly prevalent in the six New England states, New York, and
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Wisconsin. However, most of them are legally termed as municipal corporations. In
Minnesota the terms town and township are used interchangeably.
When cities, counties, municipalities, and towns engage in any form of service
contracts, tax-sharing covenants, joint construction and upkeep of some infrastructure,
there generally involves an exchange of funds unless they are handshake deals as pointed
out by Post (2002). Interlocal cooperation is measured by using interlocal revenue
transfers between selected types of local governments. Interlocal revenue information for
the year 2010 has been obtained from the Census of Governments.
Local governments exchange funds among themselves for cooperative activities
in a variety of budget categories including highways, housing and community
development, health and hospitals, public welfare, sewerage, water, gas, electric, transit
utilities, and some miscellaneous categories. Though the listed categories suggest that
localities cooperate on system maintenance as well as some lifestyle services, this
manuscript does not disaggregate the information to simplify the analysis.
Monetary transfers among local governments provide a scalar measure of
interlocal cooperation. The magnitude of interlocal monetary transfer is the measure of
the extent of interlocal cooperation between localities. This overcomes the limitations of
dichotomous variables, which simply measure the presence or the absence of interlocal
cooperation. It also overcomes the weakness in measuring the extent of cooperation by
counting the instances of interlocal agreements. The number of interlocal agreements
does not represent the magnitude of cooperative activities. Besides, interlocal contracts
only represent those cooperative activities that are formally recorded. They do not
measure the extent of cooperation that occurs through informal or handshake deals.
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This analysis specifically uses interlocal revenue transfer (ilrev) between local
governments to operationalize the dependent variable rather than interlocal expenditure
as used by some other authors (S. Post, 2002; Rawlings, 2003) because the information
on interlocal expenditure does not distinguish between a fund that is transferred to
another general-purpose local government or to a special-purpose government. Specialpurpose governments provide functionally specific services across localities. It is very
rare that they receive services from general-purpose governments that necessitate any
payments that would be reflected in interlocal revenue books of the localities. Interlocal
revenue primarily represents cooperative activities taking place among general-purpose
local governments only, which is the central focus of this study.

Independent Variables
Metropolitan fragmentation, economic distress, socio-demographic variation, and
geographic proximity are the independent variables used in this study. These variables
are measured both at the local-government level and the metropolitan level and are used
in quantitative models representing respective geographic scale.
Fragmentation of metropolitan areas is represented by a proliferation of political
jurisdictions in the regions. Many scholars have used various methods to measure
fragmentation. One of the simplest methods is to count the number of local governments
per capita in the region (Dolan, 1990). Bollens (1986) uses the number of governments
per 100,000 people as a measure of fragmentation. Similarly, Hawkins (1971) uses the
number of governments per 100,000 people as a fragmentation index. Parks and
Oakerson (1992) use the number of governments per 10,000 as a fragmentation score. In
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an effort to measure the contribution of each government to the region in addition to the
regional fragmentation, Mitchell-Weaver et al.(2000) has developed the Metropolitan
Fragmentation Index (MFI). Similarly, Miller (2002) uses the Metropolitan Power
Diffusion Index (MPDI) that measures fragmentation as well as the division of authority
among small and large jurisdictions. For simplicity, this study uses the number of local
governments (excluding school districts) per 100,000 people as the fragmentation index
(frag) of metropolitan regions as is used by Hawkins (1971), Parks and Oakerson (1992),
and Post & Stein (2000).
Reviewing the theories of metropolitan fragmentation, it is usually a result of
“voting with the feet,” i.e. residents from one jurisdiction (usually central cities) migrate
to suburban areas thereby creating new localities on the periphery of the city (Tiebout,
1956). Distance between localities within the metropolitan region has been measured in
terms of the density of local governments. This study uses distance between localities in
terms of number of jurisdictions per 100 square miles3 as a measure of proximity
(govdensity). As the density of governments increases, the number of localities per unit
area also increases, thus decreasing the geographic distances between them.
A measure of central location has been used to compare interlocal cooperation
among localities in the central city and those in the suburban areas. The variable is a
dummy that is coded 1 for jurisdictions located in central city and 0 if located in an
outlying area.
The economy variable is operationalized using the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of metropolitan areas, per capita income, median household income, and property
values. At the regional scale, Gross Domestic Product of metropolitan area (GMP)
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measures its economic vitality. Conventional measures of economy such as per capita
income and employment have also been used in the analysis. Employment information
has been regrouped into four categories: employment in the growth sector (empgrowth),
technology sector (emptech), manufacturing sector (empmanu), and the service sector
(empserv). Employment in the growth sector includes employment in retail trade,
finance, insurance, and real estate. Employment in the technology sector includes
employment in the information sector, and professional and scientific sectors.
Employment in the manufacturing sector includes all employment in the manufacturing
sector, with warehousing and transportation associated with it. Employment in the service
sector includes employment in public administration, health and educational services, and
“other” services as designated by the census. Identifying localities by dominant industries
provide the opportunity to determine which localities follow more traditional methods of
growth and which economies are more adaptive to changes in the industry.
Education is another variable that represents the economic vitality of a locality.
An educated workforce reflects the availability of high-skill employment. Employment
categories as previously explained do not make a distinction between skilled and
unskilled employment. Employment that requires skilled workforce has higher pay scale,
which increases the disposable income of the residents in a locality. Unskilled jobs
employ a large number of people, but the per capita pay is generally lower. An educated
workforce can be expected to better understand the benefits of joint endeavors between
localities and can be expected to vote in favor of them. A percentage of the population
with graduate degrees has been used as a metric for education.
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Institutional economic strength of a locality is its ability to generate revenue
through local resources. Since property taxes make up a major portion of local revenue,
median home value (homeval) has been used to asses this capacity. Higher property
values reflect stronger fiscal state of the local government whereas lower property values
represent distress of localities. From the consumers’ point of view, higher property values
also measure the demand for premium urban services.
Another measure of the economic distress of a locality is Fiscal Stress (fstress)
experienced by the governing institution. Localities with high tax-burden and low taxyield have been considered stressed fiscally (Miller et al., 1995). This reflects lower
revenues and higher expenditures. Those localities end up borrowing from the market (as
long as they maintain acceptable credit scores) or from state and federal governments to
compensate for the differential. A ratio with the total expenditure of the locality as the
numerator and its total revenue as the denominator has been used to measure fiscal stress.
Such a ratio has been suggested as a metric of fiscal stress of local governments in the
CBO Economic and Budget Issue Brief (Delisle, 2010). When the expenditure is less
than the revenue, the ratio assumes a value less than one. This suggests that localities
have been able to generate sufficient revenue to cover their costs. The numerical value of
fiscal stress of more than one signifies that expenditures exceed revenue. This is the
situation when localities either have to start reducing their expenditures by downsizing or
shutting down some services or pursue external financial support such as state and federal
governments, to meet their expenditures. In either condition, those localities are
considered to be in a state of fiscal distress.
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Sociodemographic variables include racial homogeneity, senior population,
income classes, and the measure of income inequality. Conventionally, racial makeup is
measured using a percentage of the black population. Since whites are considered to be
the majority group, an increase in the black or African-American population signifies a
more heterogeneous locality in conventional terms. In addition to the conventional
measures of race, this study uses homogeneity to measure racial makeup of the locality.
Homogeneity has been calculated as the absolute differences between percentages of the
whites and the blacks in the community. Homogeneity scale ranges from 0 to 100. A
value of 100 means that the locality has people of only one of the two races, and a score
of 0 signifies the presence of equal numbers of residents of the two races
Age of the population is another variable used in the study. Assuming that
people’s preferences are dependent on their ability to earn money and desire for a certain
lifestyle, this study focuses on the difference between a younger, economically active
demographic and a retired senior demographic. Age is measured in terms of the
percentage of the population 65 years and older (seniorpop) in the locality.
Other social variables used in the analysis are income class and income
inequality. The U.S. Census Bureau determines poverty using a threshold4 of the number
of family members and their combined incomes compared to the consumer price index.
However, this poverty threshold does not vary with geography. This study categorizes
income classes (class) in terms of their dispersion from the median household income.
Percentage of households earning less than 50 percent of the median household income
of the locality is categorized as poor, whereas those earning more than 150 percent of the
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median income are grouped as rich. All households between those two categories are
considered middle class (mclass).
Wealth differences between populations across localities have been measured
using the Gini coefficient5of income inequality. Gini coefficients have been calculated for
each metropolitan region using the information on household-income groups published in
the American Community Survey. Gini calculated for the MSAs represents income
inequality within the metropolitan regions, which also represents inequality between
localities since localities are the building blocks of MSAs. It makes more sense to
measure differences between localities in the metropolitan region than to measure
inequality within the locality because the fragmentation theory suggests that localities are
internally homogenous. The value of the Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, where
values close to 0 imply perfect equality, and those close to 1 suggest perfect inequality.
Four control variables are used in the analysis. They are age of the economy, type
of the government, census designated regions, and population size. Age of the economy
(agecity/agemsa) can influence levels of interlocal cooperation. Older localities generally
tend to have higher levels of public-service infrastructure that they can leverage with
nearby localities to achieve economies of scale. At the same time older localities also
tend to have outdated infrastructure that is overconsumed and in need of costly repair.
These localities might simply seek cooperation with their neighbors to keep maintenance
costs down irrespective of their economic state. Age of the economy is measured as
median age of the home built in the locality, similar to the one used by Ijla, Ryberg,
Rosentraub, & Bowen (2011)
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Type of government (govtype) is another control variable used in the analysis.
This variable is expected to measure the difference in voters’ preference for cooperation
if they are a county government (county), a city government (city), or a township (town).
Similarly, dummy variables for census-designated regions– northeast (ne), Midwest
(mw), the south (s), and the west (w) are used to control for regional variations to
generalize the findings. A list of all research variables, their measures, and their sources
are presented in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1
List of Research Variables
Variables
Dependent Variable
Inter-Local
Cooperation (ilrev)
Independent Variables
Fragmentation Index
(frag)

govdensity
Location (central)6
GDP
income
empgrowth
emptech
empmanu
empserv
graduate
homeval

Measures / Sources
Aggregate of revenue transfers between local governments as presented in
2010 estimates of the Census of Governments, State and Local Government
Finances
Number of local governments per 100,000 people. List of county
governments within metropolitan areas obtained from 2010 metropolitan
component counties of the census bureau. Local governments within each
metropolitan area obtained from the Government Integrated Directory of the
Census of Governments.
Number of local governments per 100 square miles
Central or outlying, census bureau, SMSA and CBSA delineation files
GDP of metropolitan area for 2010 (in thousands of dollars) published by
the Bureau of Economic Affairs
Per capita income: Selected Economic Characteristics, ACS 2010 , DP03
Employment by industry: ACS 2010, construction + retail trade+ wholesale
trade + FIRE
Employment by industry: ACS 2010, information sector + professional and
scientific sector
Employment by industry: ACS 2010, manufacturing sector + warehouse +
transportation sectors
Employment by industry: ACS 2010, education and health + other services
+ public administration
Percentage of population with graduate education, 2010 ACS, selected
social characteristics, DP02
Median home value – 2010 ACS, GCT2510

fstress

Fiscal stress: ratio of total expenditure to total revenue. 2010 Census of
Governments, state and local government finances

Race (black)
homogeneity

Percentage of population designated as “Black or African-American”, 2010
SF-1, P3
Absolute difference between percentage of Whites and Blacks in a locality

seniorpop

Percentage of Population 65 years and older, 2010 SF-1, QT-P2

poor

Families with HH income less than 50 percentof median HH income of the
MSA
Families with HH income 50 percent to 150 percent of median HH income
of the MSA
Families with HH income more than 150 percent of median HH income
Gini coefficient calculated from household income available in 2010 ACS,
Selected Economic Characteristics, DP03

mclass
rich
gini
Control Variables
Size (pop)

Total population as obtained from Census Summary Files SF-1, P1

agecity / agemsa

Median-year structure built, 2010 ACS, B25035

Type: city, county,
township
Regional Variation ne,
mw, s, w

Coded 1 for true and 0 for false. 2010 State and Local Government
Finances
Regions coded 1 for true and 0 for false
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Data Transformations
The data uses variables that have different spreads. Many of the variables also
display considerable right skewedness. To standardize the spread of the data and to
correct the skewedness in distribution, those variables have been transformed by taking
their logarithms with base 10. A log transformation does not change the relationship
between the variables but only makes the interpretation easier by minimizing skewedness
and standardizing the spread of the data. Log transformation can only be used in the case
of continuous variables. Logit transformation has been applied to the variables
representing a fraction or ratio. The transformations work as shown in the following
schemes:
Log transformation with base 10: n ---- > log10 (n)
Logit transformation using log10 function: p ----- > log10 [ p / (1 - p) ]
A list of variables transformed using logarithmic and logit methods are presented in
Table 3.2. Other transformations used in the analysis are per capita conversions and
percentages. Both transformations help to minimize spurious effects of population size on
other variables. Conversion to per capita figures has been done using the population
variable as the denominator. Percentage conversion transforms the spread of the data to a
limited scale between 0 and 100, thus making comparisons easier.

61

Table 3.2
List of Transformed Variables
Variables

Transformed
Variables

Histogram

Histogram
Histogram of logilrev

0.3
Density

0.1
0.0

0e+00

Density

Log Interlocal
Revenue

4e-05

Interlocal
Revenue

0.2

8e-05

0.4

Histogram of ilrev

0

20000

40000

60000

0

80000

1

2

0.20

Density

0.10
0.00

0

500000

1000000

6

1500000

8

10

12

14

logpop

pop

Density

0.0

0.4

2e-05

0.8

1.2

4e-05

Histogram of logincome

Log Per Capita
Income

0e+00

Density

5

0.30

4e-06
0e+00

Density

Log Population

Histogram of income

Per Capita
Income

4

Histogram of logpop

2e-06

Population

3
logilrev

ilrev

Histogram of pop

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

9.5

10.0

income

10.5

11.0

11.5

logincome

Histogram of gmp

0.8

Density

0.0

0.4

Log GMP

2e-06
0e+00

GMP

Density

1.2

Histogram of loggmp

0

200000

600000

1000000

1400000

5.0

gmp
Histogram of homeval
0.6
Density

0.2
0.0

0e+00

2e+05

4e+05

6e+05

8e+05

1e+06

10

11

12

homeval

2.0
Density

0.0
50000

60000

70000

80000

90000

10.7

10.8

10.9

11.0

hhincome

11.1

11.2

11.3

loghhincome

0.6
0.4
0.2

0.04

Logit Senior pc

Density

0.8

0.08

Histogram of logitseniorpc

0.0

0.00

Density

14

1.0

4e-05
Density

0e+00

2e-05

Log Household
Income
Histogram of seniorpc

Senior pc

13

loghomeval

Histogram of loghhincome

Histogram of hhincome

Household
Income

6.0

0.4

3.0e-06
Density

Log Home
Value

1.5e-06
0.0e+00

Home Value

5.5

loggmp
Histogram of loghomeval

0

10

20

30

40

50

-5

60

-4

-3

-2

logitseniorpc

seniorpc
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-1

0

1

11.4

Multivariate Models
This study uses Robust Linear Regression7 to identify causal relations between
selected local characteristics and interlocal cooperation. Because the analysis uses
information for three types of very differently sized localities – counties, cities, and
towns, a great deal of variation in the data for different types of governments can be
expected. Extreme numbers in this data are not outliers; they are good pieces of
information. However, they also can bias causal models if they are weighed equally.
Robust method minimizes the effects of extreme outliers while still keeping them in the
analysis. An example of a generalized model employed in this study is as follows:
Interlocal Cooperation ~ (fragmentation and proximity) + (economic
characteristics) + (social characteristics) + (control variables)
This analysis seeks to build a parsimonious model including all research
variables. In cases where variables show collinearity problems and were still required in
the model to evaluate the hypothesis, new models have been created to study the impacts
of collinear pairs separately.
This study also uses statistical diagnosis to test the suitability of regression
models. It uses Pearson’s bivariate correlations to identify unusual relationships between
pairs of research variables. Possible multicollinearity problems are identified at this stage.
Goodness of fit statistics (e.g. r-squared, adjusted r-squared, and model p-value) is
reported for each model. T-statistics and p-values for coefficients are also calculated.
Finally, model residuals are plotted against theoretical quantiles in a Q-Q plot to verify
that residuals are normally distributed. A scatterplot of residuals and fitted values is also
created for each model to determine whether they exhibit random relations.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA PORTRAYAL AND ANALYSIS

This chapter provides the description of the data including the averages,
dispersion, and range for each research variable. It is followed by a section examining the
bivariate correlations between variables, which gives a preliminary idea about the
hypothesized relations between research variables and also provides valuable information
about levels of collinearity that exist between some of them. The chapter concludes with
findings from the regression analysis. Finally, a tabular summary of results with special
reference to the research hypotheses concludes the chapter.

Summary of the Data
This study uses two datasets–one with variables aggregated for Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSAs) and another with variables measured at the local level. The first
dataset includes 51 of the largest metropolitan areas in the U.S.A. per the 2010-census
population data. The second dataset has information about 1165 localities contained
within those 51 MSAs. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 summarize the variables aggregated for
selected MSAs. Similarly, Tables 4.3 and 4.4 respectively present the frequency
distribution and descriptive summary of the variables measured at the local level.
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Table 4.1
Frequency Distribution of Binomial Variables at MSA Level
Variables

Frequency

Percent

MSAs in Northeast Region (NE)

8

15.7

MSAs in Midwest Region (MW)

10

19.6

MSAs in the South (S)

21

41.2

MSAs in the West (W)

12

23.5

N=51
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Table 4.2
Descriptive Statistics of Variables Measured at MSA Level
Variables

Min.

Max.

Average

Std. Dev.

Interlocal Revenue ($,000)

5618

1162560

207441.8

258638.1

Interlocal Revenue Per Capita ($)

4.63

321.91

65.73

60.02

Fragmentation Index

1.08

32.89

10.87

8.52

21

1356

295.8

279.23

0.27

18.84

6.27

4.61

1054323

18897109

3276223.82

3177753.58

Gross Metropolitan Product ($,000)

44607

1280307

183129.6

207233.4

Median Household Income ($)

46260

86290

56990

8788.59

Growth-Sector Employment (%)

23.11

34.83

29.56

2.60

Technology-Sector Employment (%)

10.56

23.97

14.34

2.75

6.93

22.48

15.29

3.58

21.51

38.8

30.82

3.44

Unemployed (%)

5.8

12.7

7.82

1.29

Population with Graduate Degree (%)

6.7

22.2

11.5

2.94

113900

696200

245298.03

131858.18

1.51

45.67

15.23

9.47

47.46

87.82

69.65

10.06

Homogeneity

2.25

80.48

54.42

16.67

Senior Population (%)

8.08

17.28

11.95

2.08

Poor (%)

14.7

26.69

20.9

3.11

Middle Class (%)

13.87

40.24

30.08

4.83

Rich (%)

36.65

62.43

49.01

6.75

0.36

0.52

0.42

0.031

16

57

35.6

10.4

Local Governments
Density of Governments
Total Population

Manufacturing-Sector Employment (%)
Service-Sector Employment (%)

Median Home Value ($)
Black or African-American (%)
White (%)

Gini Coefficient
Age of the MSA (years)
N=51
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Table 4.3
Frequency Distribution of Binomial Variables at Local Level
Variables

Frequency

Percent

1015

87.1

Outlying Localities

150

12.9

City

757

65.0

County

204

17.5

Township

204

17.5

NE

304

26.1

MW

430

36.9

S

270

23.2

W

161

13.8

Central Localities

N = 1,164

67

Table 4.4
Descriptive Statistics of Variables Measured at Local level
Variables

Min.

Max.

Average

Std. Dev.

Interlocal Revenue ($,000)

1

88226

4092.64

10177.93

Interlocal Revenue per capita ($)

0.02

13853.88

78.31

439.47

Total Revenue ($000)

491

5102000

200400

501688.6

I-L Revenue as Percent of Total

.001

63.42

4.07

7.37

I-L Revenue as Percent (City)

.001

63.42

4.54

8.07

I-L Revenue as Percent (Town)

.001

34.74

3.85

6.44

I-L Revenue as Percent (County)

.004

30.4

2.35

4.06

Total Population

219

1714773

113652.39

222865.82

Per Capita Income ($)

11161

115334

32000.72

12216.65

Growth-Sector Employment (%)

11.75

63.31

29.62

4.12

Technology-Sector Employment (%)

1.2

39.8

14.04

4.72

Manufacturing-Sector Employment (%)

2.4

42.73

16.7

5.67

Service-Sector Employment (%)

12.98

55.57

30.5

5.24

Unemployed (%)

1.00

24.80

7.27

2.87

Fiscal Stress

0.108

9.79

1.00

0.326

Population with Graduate Degree (%)

0

48.69

12.47

8.34

Median Home Value ($)

33600

1000000

271865.55

158245.73

Black or African-American (%)

0.17

93.97

11.01

15.48

White (%)

1.96

100

76.61

18.89

Homogeneity

0.01

98.73

69.0

24.48

Senior Population (%)

0.47

96.43

12.99

5.43

Poor (%)

1.76

66.6

25.3

11.4

Middle Class (%)

4.56

65.05

34.77

8.18

Rich (%)

6.62

90.1

39.94

15.23

Age of the Locality (years)

7.00

71.00

36.84

14.80

N = 1,164
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As shown in Table 4.1, about 41 percent of the MSAs selected for this study are
in the South, approximately 20 percent of them are in the West and the Midwest each,
and about 16 percent are in the Northeast.
The extent of interlocal cooperation represented by the aggregated interlocalrevenue transfers among localities measured at the MSA level ranges from about $4.63 to
$322 per person. On average, local governments in metropolitan areas generate about $65
per person in interlocal revenue. Measured at the local government level, interlocal
revenue per capita averages about $78 per person. Similarly, interlocal-revenue transfers
between selected localities range from two cents to almost $13,900 per capita, with actual
monetary amounts ranging from $1,000 to around $88 million. The standard deviation is
about $10 million or $440 per capita. The data range, averages, and dispersion tell us that
interlocal revenue is skewed to the right of the distribution. This suggests there are fewer
localities with very high interlocal revenues compared to a large number with low to
moderate revenue transfers. Additionally, city governments have slightly higher average
interlocal revenue than townships and county governments. The average per capita
interlocal revenue of city governments is $4.54 compared to $3.85 of townships and
$2.35 of county governments. Table 4.5 lists some of the localities and MSAs with the
highest and lowest amounts of interlocal-revenue transfers.
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Table 4.5
MSAs and Localities with Highest and Lowest Interlocal Revenue Transfers Per Capita
Highest
MSA

Lowest
Locality

MSA

Locality

Memphis, TN

Industry City, CA

Hartford, CT

Piscataway Township, NJ

Rochester, NY

Fenton City, MO

Boston, MA

Jefferson County, WV

Buffalo, NY

Falls Church City, VA

Oklahoma City, OK

Gloucester Township, NJ

Las Vegas, NV

Des Peres City, MO

Pittsburgh, PA

Valparaiso Town, IN

Washington, DC

Mathews County, VA

Providence, RI

Shoreview City, MN

Average fragmentation index in the MSAs is about 11 local governments per
100,000 people. The range varies from approximately two governments to 33
government units for every 100,000 people. Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Denver, Kansas City
(Mo.–Kan.), and Memphis (Tenn.–Miss.–Ark.) are the five most fragmented
metropolitan regions in this dataset. Similarly, Las Vegas, Baltimore, Houston, Los
Angeles, and Washington D.C. are the five least fragmented regions. The number of local
governments including cities, counties, municipalities, townships, villages, and special
districts range from 21 to 1,356 with an average of 295.8. Chicago, New York, St. Louis,
Denver, and Pittsburgh have the most local governments by count. Urban regions with
the least number of local governments are Las Vegas, New Orleans, Virginia Beach
(Va.), Baltimore, and Raleigh (N.C.). Similarly, the range of density information reveals
that localities are condensed to about19 units within 10 square miles, to less than one unit
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within that geography. The average density of governments is about six units per 100
square miles.
Of the 1,164 localities selected, 204 (17.5 percent) are county governments, 756
(65 percent) are city or municipality governments, and the remaining 204 (17.5 percent)
are township governments. Of all the townships used in this study, 84 percent (172) are in
the Northeast, and the remaining 32 are in the Midwest. Similarly, of 756 cities and
municipalities, 101 (13 percent) are in the Northeast, 345 (45 percent) are in the Midwest,
173 (29 percent) from the South, and 137 (18 percent) are from the West. Of the selected
localities 87 percent are located fully or partially in a central county.
Data related to the size of the localities has shown to be right-skewed as well. The
smallest local government in the dataset has 219 people, and the largest has about 1.8
million people, with an average of around 113,000 and a standard deviation of 222,000
people.
Localities selected for this study also vary considerably in terms of their economic
characteristics. With a minimum of $44 million and a maximum of $1.2 billion, the
average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the metropolitan areas selected for this study
is $183 million, a metric that also seems to be right skewed. Another metric of economic
vitality at the metropolitan level is median household income. It ranges from $46,260 to
$86,290, an average of $56,990, which is also has a distribution that is slightly skewed to
the right. Per capita income measured at the local level is also similarly skewed to the
right. It ranges from $11,161 to $115,334 with an average of $32,000.
Among the four employment groups used in this study, most localities show
higher average employment in the growth-sector and the service-sector, each group
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making almost 30 percent of the total employment. Average employment in the
manufacturing and the technology sectors are 14 percent and 16 percent respectively. The
percentages are comparable when aggregated at the MSA level as well. The
manufacturing sector and service sector show more variation across localities as
compared to the growth and the technology sectors. Unemployment, however, has a very
low dispersion of 2.87 percent and 1.29 percent measured at the local and MSA levels
respectively. Average unemployment in the selected localities is about 7 percent.
Other measures of economic vitality used here are education and median home
value. The percentage of population with graduate degrees measured at the localgovernment level ranges from 0 to 48.69. On an average, about 13 percent graduatedegree holders live in the selected localities. The skews in the data show that while a
majority of localities have their percentage of graduate population near the average, very
few of them have extremely high percentage of residents with higher education.
Median home value also has similar characteristics: an average of $271,865.55, a
minimum of $33,600, and a maximum of $1 million. The very fact that all these metrics
of economic vitality have high variations and are skewed to the right suggests the
possibility of considerable inequalities among localities within metropolitan areas.
This study uses various measures of inequalities. One of them is the Gini
coefficient of income inequality. Comparing household income among census-designated
income cohorts of population across the metropolitan region shows that the Gini
coefficient varies from 0.36 to 0.52. A value near zero means perfect equality, whereas a
value near 1 suggests perfect inequality.
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Income inequality within localities has also been measured through categorization
of population by income. On average, localities have about 25 percent of poor people.
Some localities have poor populations as low as 1.76 percent and some as high as 66.6
percent. Comparing this to the numbers aggregated at the metropolitan scale shows that
sharp differences between localities are dulled when measured at regional levels. The
data shows that about 21 percent poor people reside in metropolitan regions with a
minimum of 14.7 percent and a maximum of 26.69 percent.
Similarly, the average percentages of middle-class people and rich people in
localities are about 35 percent and 40 percent respectively. The middle-class population
varies from 4.56 percent to 62.05 percent, while rich varies from 6.62 percent to 90.1
percent respectively. Variations measured at the aggregate metropolitan scale are much
lower than this. The middle-class population in MSAs ranges from about 14 percent to 40
percent, averaging 30 percent. Likewise, the percentage of rich people ranges from 36 to
62 averaging 49 percent measured at the MSA level. This probably suggests that while
regions as a whole do not seem unequal, individual localities are highly segregated with
respect to economic classes.
Fiscal stress, measured as a ratio between total expenditure of the locality and the
total revenue of localities, ranges from 0.108 to 9.79 with an average of 1.0. The average
suggests that the expenses of most localities are comparable to revenues. Minimum and
maximum values suggest that localities spend 10 times less than what they earn while
others spend almost 10 times more than their total revenue.
In terms of race, the selected localities have an average of 11 percent AfricanAmerican population with a minimum of 0.17 percent and a maximum of almost 94

73

percent. Similarly, the average percentage of whites is 76.61, ranging from 1.96 percent
to 100 percent. Southlake City in Tarrant County within the Dallas-Fort Worth
metropolitan region has a 100 percent white population, whereas Robbins Village in
Cook County in the Chicago-Joliet-Naperville metropolitan region has a 94 percent black
population. Homogeneity, which has been calculated as the absolute difference in
percentage between whites and African-Americans, ranges from 0.01 to 98.73 with an
average value of 69.0. This suggests that the average difference between the percentage
of whites and the blacks in the selected localities is 69 percent. The homogeneity scale
ranges from 0 to 100, 0 being perfectly heterogeneous and 100 being perfectly
homogenous.
The senior demographic in the locality averages around 13 percent with ranges
from 0.47 to 96.43 percent. When aggregating at the metropolitan level, the percentage of
the senior population ranges from 8 percent to about 17 percent with an average of about
12 percent. The distribution shows tremendous skewedness when measured at the local
level.
The study uses age of the locality to control for the variations between older and
newer localities. Age of the locality is measured through the median year of the built
structure, which ranges from 7 years to 71 years. The average age of localities is around
37 years and the dispersion within the data is almost 15 years. The median metropolitan
age averages 35.6 years with a minimum of 16 years and a maximum of 57 years.
In all respects, variables measured at the local level provide sharper contrast
compared to those collected at the metropolitan level because the extreme values
measured at the local level become diluted while aggregating and averaging at the MSA
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level. Interaction among localities is the focus of this study. Most of the analysis is
focused on comparing characteristics of the localities. However, local characteristics such
as fragmentation and Gini are calculated using MSA data to measure variation among
localities across the region.

Bivariate Correlations
This section examines Pearson’s bivariate correlations between research
variables, and this study uses bivariate correlations as a diagnostic tool. The primary
focus is to understand preliminary relationships between variables intended to be used in
multivariate regression. The very high correlation coefficient between pairs of variables
suggests possibility of multicollinearity effects later in multivariate models. This
information will be used to either completely remove some affected variables from
regression models or stagger those pairs of variables in different models if they need to
be used at all. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present Pearson’s correlation matrices for variables
measured at MSA and local levels respectively.
In the table with variables representing MSA characteristics, the dependent
variable—Intergovernmental Revenue (logged)—does not seem to have questionably
higher correlations with any of the predictor variables. However, a few cautionary
relationships among the variables are worth mentioning here. The Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) of metropolitan areas is correlated with population. This means that
metropolitan regions with a greater population have a higher GDP as well. This
relationship is too obvious. To avoid spurious correlations further in the analysis, GDP
has been transformed into GDP per capita by normalizing it with the population of
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metropolitan areas. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the (log of) GDP per
capita with (log of) population is 0.22 after the transformation. This is shown in Table
4.9.
Pairs of variables like emptechpc-hhincom, graduatepc-emptechpc, homogeneityblackpc, gini-hhincome, and gini-graduatepc have bivariate correlation coefficients
upwards of 0.8. Naturally, the percentage of the graduate population correlates strongly
with employment in the technical sector since most technical jobs require an educated
and skilled workforce.
Homogeneity is calculated using the absolute difference between the white
population and the African-American population. Both, white and black variables can be
expected to highly correlate with homogeneity.
Similarly, in the dataset with variables representing characteristics of local
governments, the percentage of the population with graduate degrees correlates with per
capita income. This relationship is also obvious since higher education generally enables
one to get better paying jobs.
These obvious correlations are duly noted and those variables are staggered in
different regression models to avoid possible multicollinearity effects.
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Table 4.6
Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for Variables Measured at the MSA Level
Variables

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19
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1

Log I-L Revenue

1

2

Fragmentation

-.2

1

3

Government Density

.11

.53

1

4

Log Population

.66

-.23

.33

1

5

Log GDP

.62

-.24

.34

.96

1

6

Log HH Income

.31

-.28

.04

.37

.51

1

7

Emp. Growth pc

-.29

.03

-.06

-.04

-.02

-.15

1

8

Emp. Tech pc

.29

-.2

.01

.36

.51

.80

.00

1

9

Emp. Manufacture pc

-.15

.40

.37

-.10

-.05

-.07

-.24

-.22

1

10

Emp. Service pc

-.01

.15

.29

-.10

-.06

.21

-.20

.17

-.11

1

11

Graduate pc

.21

-.08

.23

.23

.39

.82

-.27

.82

-.00

.51

1

12

Home Value

.5

-.37

.04

.42

.5

.79

-.26

.62

-.12

-.00

.59

1

13

Race Black pc

.04

-.05

-.08

-.07

-.06

-.23

-.05

-.15

-.05

.11

-.11

-.31

1

14

Race White pc

-.48

.49

.27

-.34

-.38

-.40

.28

-.29

.21

.23

-.18

-.52

-.45

1

15

Homogeneity

-.32

.32

.21

-.16

-.19

-.10

.20

-.08

.16

.07

-.04

-.13

-.84

.86

1

16

Poor pc

.18

-.09

-.08

.16

.14

.04

-.01

-.02

.14

-.41

-.16

.07

.07

-.29

-.22

1

17

Middle Class pc

-.15

.10

-.01

-.06

-.09

-.07

.34

-.12

-.02

.02

-.19

-.28

-.03

.35

.23

.41

1

18

Rich pc

-.19

.26

.21

-.24

-.21

-.19

-.19

-.11

.17

.29

.09

-.14

.12

.15

.02

-.73

-.71

1

19

Gini

.21

-.10

.18

.14

.28

.88

-.32

.68

.04

.43

.86

.67

-.23

-.19

.01

-.06

-.09

.01

1

20

Age MSA

.14

.26

.71

.14

.16

.07

-.42

-.06

.38

.53

.33

.16

-.09

.23

.19

-.24

-.18

.38

.35

Table 4.7
Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for Variables Measured at Local Level
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Variables

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

1

Log I-L Revenue

1

2

Log Population

.50

1

3

Log Per capita Income

-.01

-.03

1

4

Emp. Growth pc

-.01

-.03

.17

1

5

Emp. Tech pc

.10

.09

.62

.39

1

6

Emp. Manufacture pc

-.17

-.16

-.30

.16

-.23

1

7

Emp. Service pc

-.01

-.06

.15

.38

.34

-.02

1

8

Graduate pc

.03

-.00

.85

-.01

.62

-.43

.22

1

9

Home Value

-.00

.08

.70

.16

.54

-.33

.08

.61

1

10

Race Black pc

.15

.17

-.33

-.22

-.13

-.16

.03

-.17

-.26

1

11

Race White pc

-.20

-.32

.32

.22

.01

.20

.04

.15

-.00

-.79

1

12

Homogeneity

-.23

-.36

.29

.16

.00

.18

.03

.13

.05

-.67

.83

1

13

Poor pc

-.05

-.17

.19

.14

.08

-.02

.33

.13

.03

-.11

.23

.20

1

14

Middle Class pc

.07

.03

-.44

.07

-.05

.10

.17

-.34

-.25

.31

-.31

-.28

.19

1

15

Rich pc

-.10

-.10

-.16

.44

.12

.30

.40

-.26

-.05

-.01

.02

.03

.26

.57

1

16

Age Locality

-.01

-.09

.01

-.12

.07

-.11

.26

.16

.04

.16

-.17

-.14

.29

.30

.12

Robust Coefficients of Regional Variables
This section examines the causal effects of the local characteristic on interlocal
cooperation controlling for cumulative effects of other variables.

Models 1 and 2

examine the effects of variables measured at the MSA level on aggregate interlocal
revenue. Models 3, 4, and 5 examine similar correlations between the variables measured
at the local-government level. The coefficients and relevant statistics for Models 1 and 2
are presented in Table 4.8.
Among all the variables used in Model 1, population and homogeneity generate
coefficients significant at confidence interval of 99 percent. Government density and the
binary variable representing localities in the South reach statistical significance at 95
percent confidence interval. Similarly, fragmentation, GDP per capita, median household
income, and percent employment in the technology sector produce robust coefficients
that are significant at 90 percent confidence interval. The Gini coefficient, which
measures the income inequality within an MSA, cannot produce a statistically significant
coefficient. The coefficient for the age of the MSA is also not significant statistically;
however, it still needs to be retained in the model since it is one of the control variables.
The model has r-squared value of .637 and an adjusted r-squared value of .546.
The value of r-squared suggests that the model is able to explain almost 64 percent of the
variation caused by the included independent variables on interlocal cooperation.
Adjusted r-squared has been calculated to control the inflation in r-squared caused by the
inclusion of statistically insignificant but analytically relevant variables. The adjusted rsquared suggests that even if statistically insignificant variables are removed from the
model, it can still explain the 54.6 percent variation in the dependent variable.

79

Table 4.8
Robust coefficients at MSA Level
Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Fragmentation

.012 (.231)*

.024 (.252)**

Gov. Density

-.058 (-.45)**

-.063 (-.404)*

Homogeneity

-.015 (-.50)***

x

South

-.577 (-.684)**

x

GMP Per Capita(log)

-.468 (-.763)*

x

HH Income (log)

-3.07 (-.659)*

Emp. Tech. pc

.131 (.269)*

x

Gini

8.72 (.367)

x

White pc

x

-.255(-.059)

-.015 (-.271)*

Age of MSA

-.004 (-.114)

.011 (.012)

Population (log)

2.49 (1.54)***

1.37 (.598)***

Intercept

25.34*

-.11*

r-squared

.637

.51

Adj r-squared

.546

.44

Notes:
DV = Interlocal Revenue Transfers (Log10)
p<.01***, .01<p<.05** , .05<p<.1*
( ) = values in parentheses are standardized coefficients
x = variables not included in this model
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Variables

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1

IL Rev (log)

1

2

Pop (log)

.59

1

3

Govt. density

-.01

.33

1

4

Homogeneity

-.32

-.16

.21

1

5

GDP per capita (log)

.00

.22

.16

-.17

1

6

HH Income (log)

.22

.37

.04

-.10

.62

1

7

Emp. Tech. pc

.23

.36

.01

-.08

.65

.80

1

8

Gini

.10

.14

.18

.01

.55

.88

.68

1

9

Age of MSA

-.01

.14

.71

.19

.12

.07

-.06

.35

1

10

White pc

-.44

-.34

.27

.86

-.27

-.40

-.29

-.19

.23

1

11

Fragmentation

-.15

-.23

.53

.32

-.09

-.28

-.20

-.10

.26

.49

Population is the most influential variable in the model with a standardized beta
coefficient of 1.54. This means that one unit change in population causes an increase in
interlocal revenue by 1.54 times its standard deviation. Besides representing the size of
metropolitan areas, population variable also works as a control variable in the model.
The second most influential variable is the per capita gross domestic product of
the metropolitan area (GDP), which has a negative standardized beta coefficient of -.763.
This suggests that a unit increase in per capita GMP causes a decrease in interlocal
cooperation by a factor of .76 of its standard deviation.
Household income also shows a similar negative causal link with interlocal
cooperation. The results suggest that increase in household income causes a decrease in
interlocal revenue by almost 66 percent of its standard dispersion.
Similarly, increase in racial homogeneity by twice its standard deviation is found
to decrease interlocal cooperation by one standard deviation. Government density also
has a negative relationship with interlocal cooperation where increase in density by 1
percent of its standard deviation causes a decrease in interlocal revenue by half of its
standard dispersion.
A second model is run using metropolitan data focused on prominent economic,
racial, and fragmentation information from the first model. This model uses the
percentage of white population instead of the homogeneity index to measure the effects
of race in interlocal cooperation. This model attains a r-squared of .51. After adjustment
for unresponsive variables, the model is still able to explain 44 percent of variations
caused by the selected MSA characteristics on aggregate interlocal cooperation.
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The coefficient for fragmentation index gets better in this model whereas medianhousehold income loses its predictive power. Fragmentation is positively correlated with
interlocal cooperation with an impact factor of almost 25 percent of its standard
deviation.
Similarly, percent of white population shows a negative correlation with interlocal
cooperation. As the percentage of white population increases by one standard deviation,
there is a corresponding decrease in interlocal cooperation by a factor of .27 of its
standard deviation. This relationship is statistically significant at 90 percent confidence
interval.
The density of government has the same directional relationship and retains
almost the same predictive power as in the first model. These findings partially support
the arguments laid out in the first hypothesis of this study. Fragmentation produces
significant positive coefficients as hypothesized, but the proximity variable shows a
directional relationship different than what was expected. These relationships will be
discussed in the next chapter.
Economic variables are found to behave in accordance with the expected
relationships. Gross metropolitan product and household income both produce negative
coefficients and substantially higher beta coefficients. This is consistent with the
hypothesis related to economic distress and how it forces localities to cooperate.
Employment in the technological sector, however, produces statistically significant
positive coefficient. This reflects localities’ attempt to reap joint benefits in information
and technology sectors.
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Finally, the binary variable representing metropolitan areas in the South produces
a significantly strong negative coefficient suggesting that these MSAs are less likely to
engage in interlocal cooperation compared to their counterparts in the Northeast, Midwest
and the West. This is hardly a surprise as the result is quite consistent with Elazar’s
categorization of regions where the South is generally considered to have a
traditionalistic political culture and to be more conservative (Elazar, 1972).
Regression models and the coefficients are sufficiently reliable. A number of
diagnostic tests are carried out to verify the significance of the coefficients. Figure 4.1
shows plots between standardized residuals and robust distances. It shows the presence of
some outliers in the data. These outliers are real data points with real significance in the
research and not data errors. This is why robust methods are employed to keep them in
the analysis while preventing them from skewing the correlations. The normal q-q plot
has also been generated, and it shows that the residuals are generally distributed
normally, implying that the model satisfies the normality assumption of linear regression.
In addition, the plot between the residuals and fitted values show a random relationship,
which implies that no internal biases exist between the research variables, which further
adds to the robustness of the model. A correlation matrix between variables included in
the first model is presented in Table 4.11, which shows the absence of collinearity among
the model variables.

Robust Coefficients of Local Variables
Models 3, 4, and 5 compare various characteristics of localities against the
variable representing interlocal cooperation. Table 4.10 lists model statistics including
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robust coefficients, standardized robust coefficients, significances, and the goodness of
fit. Model 3 is the base model for variables measured at the local level. It includes most
of the statistically significant research variables along with the control variables. Models
4 and 5 stagger potentially spurious variables in Model 3 and help to further clarify the
relationships. Figure 4.3 presents diagnostic plots, and Table 4.11 presents the correlation
matrix of the variables included in Model 3.
Model 3 shows relationship between socioeconomic, political, and geographic
characteristics and interlocal cooperation.

Most of the included variables produce

statistically significant robust coefficients. Variables such as population, home value,
middle class, income, and poverty produce coefficients at 99 percent confidence interval.
Employment in the growth sector produces coefficients at 95 percent confidence interval,
whereas rich, senior population and employment in manufacturing sector produce
coefficients significant at 90 percent confidence interval. The variable representing
localities in the South slightly misses the significance bracket, whereas the variable
representing age of the city is not significant at all. The model converges with an rsquared of .34 and an adjusted r-squared of .33. This suggests that the predictors used in
the model are able to explain 34 percent of variance in the dependent variable. Even after
correcting for the effects of insignificant variables in the model, it explains 33 percent of
the variance.
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Table 4.10
Robust Coefficients at Local Level
Variables

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Population (log)

.878 (.572)***

.787 (.486)***

.808 (.497)***

Per Capita Income (log)

1.58 (.25)***

1.47 (.199)***

1.00 (.148)**

Middle Class pc

-.04 (-.194)***

x

x

Home Value (log)

-.293 (-.179)***

-.29 (-.158)***

-.223 (-.127)***

Poor pc

.029 (.158)***

x

City

.32 (.156)***

x

Rich pc

-.026 (-.072)*

Emp. Manu pc

-.02 (-.07)*

x

x

Senior pc (logit)

.168 (.068)*

x

x

Emp. Growth pc

.026 (.002)**

x

x

Age of City

-.001(-.02)

x

x

South

-.033 (-.023)

x

x

Graduate pc

x

White pc

x

Black pc

x

.015 (.053)*
x

-.017 (-.081)*

x

x

.01 (.10)

-.003 (-.03)*
x

x
.002 (.007)

Intercept

-4.20**

-3.33**

-2.78**

r-squared

.342

.285

.284

Adj. r-squared

.335

.281

.281

Notes:
DV = Interlocal Revenue Transfers (Log10)
p<.01***, .01<p<.05** , .05<p<.1*
( ) = values in parentheses are standardized coefficients
x = variables not included in this model
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Figure 4.2
Regression Diagnostics for Model 2, Plots
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Table 4.11
Regression Diagnostics for Model 2, Correlations
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Variables

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1

I-L Rev (log)

1

2

Pop (log)

.50

1

3

Homeval (log)

-.00

.081

1

4

MClass pc

-.10

-.1

-.05

1

5

Income (log)

-.00

-.03

.7

-.16

1

6

Poor pc

.07

-.07

-.25

.57

-.44

1

7

Emp. Growth pc

-.01

-.03

.16

.44

.17

.07

1

8

Rich pc

-.05

-.07

.48

-.13

.79

-.34

.27

1

9

Senior pc (logit)

-.05

-.17

.03

.26

.19

.19

.14

.23

1

10

Emp. Manu pc

-.17

-.16

-.33

.30

-.3

.1

.16

-.08

-.02

1

11

Age of City

-.01

-.09

.04

.12

.01

.3

-.12

-.07

.29

-.11

1

12

White pc

-.20

-.32

-.009

.02

.32

-.31

.22

.37

.26

.20

-.17

1

13

Black pc

.15

.17

-.26

-.01

-.33

.31

-.22

-.33

-.12

-.16

.16

-.79

As with Models 1 and 2, this model also reports local economic characteristic as
one of the strongest predictors of interlocal cooperation. The standardized beta coefficient
for per capita income in Model 3 is .25, which means that an increase of one standard
deviation in per capita income can cause a corresponding increase in interlocal revenue
by nearly a quarter of its standard deviation.
Percentage of middle-class population is another variable that produces strong
beta coefficients. One standard deviation increase in the percentage of middle-class
population corresponds to a decrease in interlocal revenue by nearly 20 percent of its
standard deviation.
Home value is the fourth most influential variable in the model, and it also has
negative correlation with interlocal revenue. One percent increase in home value within a
locality corresponds to nearly .18 percent decrease in its interlocal revenue.
The percentage of poor people in a locality is positively correlated with interlocal
cooperation. A unit increase in the percentage of poor people corresponds to almost .15
percent increase in interlocal revenue. Percentage of rich people, on the other hand,
correlates negatively with interlocal cooperation. A 100 percent increase in rich
population corresponds to only 7.2-percent-point decrease in interlocal revenue. The
relationship is statistically significant at 90 percent confidence interval.
Employment in manufacturing sector is also negatively correlated with interlocal
cooperation. Its influence factor is negative 7 percent. Employment in growth sector, on
the other hand, correlates positively with interlocal cooperation, and the relationship is
also very significant statistically. However, the influence factor of this variable is just
about .02 percent.
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Similarly, an increase in the percentage of the senior population in a locality
corresponds to an increase in interlocal cooperation. As percentage of senior population
increases by one standard deviation, interlocal revenue increases by nearly 7 percent of
its standard deviation.
Even though type of local government has just been used as a control variable, it
produces a statistically significant coefficient that is worth mentioning. Compared to
localities designated as county or township, a city or a municipality has 15 percent more
probability of engaging in interlocal cooperation.
Models 4 and 5 more closely examine the relationship of social characteristics
with interlocal cooperation. Suspecting possible collinearity between income classes and
racial groups, these two models stagger those variables and compare the results with the
base model. Population, per capita income, and average home value are variables that
produce the strongest coefficients in Model 3. These three variables are retained in
Models 4 and 5 as well. Economic classes correlate with one another, hence they cannot
be analyzed together in the same model. Model 4 evaluates the correlation between the
percentage of rich people on interlocal cooperation, while Model 5 examines the same
relationship using percentage of poor people. Similarly, the variable representing the
percentage of white population is used in Model 4 whereas black percentage is used in
Model 5. Both models attain coefficients of determination (r-squared) of 0.28 suggesting
that the independent variables used in both models are able to explain more than 28
percent of the variation in interlocal cooperation.
Per capita income and median home value produce coefficients that are
statistically significant at 99 percent confidence interval in Model 4. Per capita income is
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positively correlated with interlocal cooperation with an influence factor of nearly 20
percent. However, median home value is negatively correlated with interlocal
cooperation. One unit increase in median home value causes interlocal cooperation to
decrease by almost 15 percent of its standard deviation.
Likewise, percentage of rich people and percentage of white population produce
coefficients significant at 90 percent confidence interval. Both variables are negatively
correlated with interlocal cooperation. One standard deviation increase in the percentage
of rich people causes a corresponding decrease in interlocal revenue by about 8 percent of
its standard deviation. Percentage of white population similarly causes a negative 3
percent change in interlocal cooperation. The effects caused by percentage of rich people
and the percentage of white people on interlocal cooperation are small but are statistically
significant.
The coefficient for median home value reaches statistical significance at 99
percent confidence interval in Model 5. Per capita income attains a significance at 95
percent confidence interval, and the percentage of poor people produces coefficient at 90
percent confidence interval. The coefficients produced by percentage of graduate
population and the percentage of black population do not attain statistical significance.
As per capita income increases by one standard deviation, it causes interlocal revenue to
increase by nearly 15 percent of its standard deviation. As with the previous two models,
increase in median home value causes interlocal revenue to decrease, and the influence
factor is about 12 percent of its standard dispersion. The increase in the percentage of
poor people in the jurisdiction, however, causes interlocal revenue to increase by a factor
of 5 percent.
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The base model satisfies the conditions of linear regression. Plot of standardized
residuals and robust distances show a number of outliers in the dataset. Robust
coefficients are hardly influenced by the presence of outliers. The q-q plot of residuals
versus theoretical values presented in Figure 4.3 shows a nearly perfect normal
distribution of the residuals. Another plot showing the relationship between the residuals
and fitted values tells that they are fairly independent and random. These diagnostics
show that the regression model satisfies all assumptions and is better able to predict the
relationship between independent variables and the dependent variable. Additionally, the
correlation matrix of model variables presented in Table 4.11 demonstrates the absence
of collinearity between variables.
Summary of Results
Table 4.12 presents the summary of findings from the quantitative analysis. The
table lays out all variables used in robust models and their hypothesized relationship with
the variable representing interlocal cooperation. The table also lists standardized beta
coefficients of all variables, their direction of association, and statistical significances.
The last column in the table indicates whether the hypothesized directions of
relationships are substantiated by the analysis. The following chapter is dedicated to the
discussion of the relationships between variables used in this research.
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Table 4.12
Summary of Standardized Coefficients at MSA and Local Level
Variables

Expected
Relationship

Local
Sig.
-

Observed Relationship
Interlocal Revenue
MSA
beta
Sig.
.252
**

Outcome as
Expected
Y

94

Fragmentation

+ve

beta
-

Government Density

+ve

-

-

-.45

**

N

GMP

-ve

-

-

-.763

*

Y

Per Capita Income
Household Income

-ve
-ve

.25
-

***
-

-.659

*

N
Y

Emp. in Growth Sector
Emp. in Tech Sector
Emp. in Manufacture Sector
Home Value
Homogeneity

-ve
-ve
-ve
-ve
+ve

.002
-.07
-.179
-

**
*
***
-

.269
-.5

*
***

N
N
Y
Y
N

Senior Population
White percent
Poor
Middle Class
Rich

+ve
-ve
+ve
+ve
-ve

.068
-.03
.158
-.194
-.072

*
*
***
***
*

-.271
-

*
-

Y
Y
Y
N
Y

Gini
Size (Population)
Age of City/MSA
City
South

-ve
-ve
-

.572
-.02
.156
-.023

***
***
-

.367
1.54
-.114
-.684

***
**

N
-

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION

This chapter revisits theories and hypotheses laid out in Chapters II and III in light
of the findings from data analysis. Table 4.12 presented at the end of the previous chapter
summarizes the relationships between local characteristics and interlocal cooperation.
This chapter analyzes those results and puts them in the context of the hypotheses laid out
for this study.
The dependent variable–local intergovernmental cooperation–is measured using
information on interlocal monetary transfers. The study considers any form of interlocal
transfer of funds to be the measure of cooperation among localities. The extent of
interlocal revenue of localities depends on various urban services and infrastructure sold
to their neighbors, funds received as payments on joint ventures, and funds received as
fulfillment of a tax-sharing covenant that exists between them. The descriptive summary
of the data shows that on average localities receive approximately $80 per capita in
interlocal revenue. About 4 percent of total revenue of localities comes from
intergovernmental transfers. Some localities receive as little as .001 percent while others
receive as much as 63 percent of their revenue from other local governments. Among the
three types of general-purpose local governments analyzed in this study, cities and
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municipalities report the highest percentage of interlocal revenue, followed by townships,
and then by counties.

Fragmentation and Interlocal Cooperation
Metropolitan fragmentation is the foundation of variation across urban regions.
Fragmentation is an outcome of lifestyle choices made by the population.
Consolidationists often tout fragmentation as an insurmountable hurdle against regional
collective action and suggest that dissolving political boundaries is the best way to
address inequalities (Aron, 1969; Peirce, Johnson, & Hall, 1993; Rusk, 1993, 1999, 2003;
Wood, 1961). This manuscript considers metropolitan fragmentation as an opportunity
rather than a problem. On one hand, it serves the purpose of creating choices for people–
thus enhancing local democracy, and on the other hand, it increases the potential for
regional collective action by increasing the number of participants. Results obtained from
the analysis fully support this hypothesis. Analysis of data at the regional level reveals
strong causal link between fragmentation and interlocal cooperation.
Fragmentation creates localities with diversity of demand for public services and
the ability of residents to pay for those services. With the presence of a multitude of
service producers and providers in the region, localities can easily cooperate with those
that have similar preferences for the type and quality of public services and are willing to
jointly reap the benefits of scale economy.
The literature also claims that fragmentation enables rich people to prevent the
poor from getting access to richer and better-served localities by implementing
discriminatory land-use policies to minimize an unwanted burden on the infrastructure
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and to keep taxes low (Downs, 1994; Ledebur & Barnes, 1992). Fragmentation has also
been suggested to be an outcome of peoples’ choice for racially homogenous
communities (Burns, 1994). Fragmentation is considered to be the result of urban
residents voting with their feet in favor of better-served communities (Tiebout, 1956),
which connotes a constant state of competition among neighboring localities. On the
grounds of these theories, preferences for racial segregation and economic
competitiveness do not seem to support interlocal cooperation. However, the fact that
fragmentation is still strongly correlated with interlocal cooperation after controlling for
the effects of income and race suggests that other centripetal forces are stronger than the
centrifugal push created by racial and economic segregation. It suggests that benefits
accrued through the economies of scale in service production and through sharing risks
by engaging in joint ventures far outweigh the costs of competitive behavior among
fragmented localities. The results of this study also support the findings of Johnson and
Neiman (2004) in which they conduct a survey of the managers of local governments and
find that localities do cooperate with their neighbors whom they consider to be their
competitors.
The relationship between regional fragmentation and interlocal cooperation
reported by this manuscript is different from the findings presented by Post (2002). This
study does not support her claim that fragmentation negatively influences interlocal
cooperation. The primary reason can be attributed to the methods used in measurement of
interlocal cooperation. She uses event-count of interlocal monetary transfers as her
dependent variable whereas this study measures the magnitude of interlocal revenue
transfers. Counting of interlocal transfers deflates the extent of interlocal cooperation,
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which could be one reason for the difference between Post’s (2002) findings and the
findings of this study.
The outcome of this research regarding the relationship between fragmentation
and interlocal cooperation also contradicts the findings of Olberding (2002b) and
Hawkins (2010). They report fragmentation to be negatively correlated with partnership
for economic development. The differences in findings may be attributed to the
differences in measurement of the dependent variable. Both operationalize interlocal
cooperation in the form of a dichotomous variable, that has shortcomings already
discussed.
By utilizing an appropriate measurement for the extent of interlocal cooperation
among localities, this analysis strongly supports the hypothesis that metropolitan
fragmentation helps to enhance interlocal cooperation among localities. The null
hypothesis that fragmentation does not affect interlocal cooperation is therefore rejected.

Geographic Proximity and Interlocal Cooperation
Based on Axelrod’s (1984) theory of cooperation, this study expected to find a
higher magnitude of cooperation among localities that are geographically nearer one
another. However, the findings from the data do not support this hypothesis. In this study,
geographic proximity is operationalized as density of governments measured in terms of
the number of local governments within 100 square miles. The robust coefficients
between proximity and interlocal cooperation are negative and are statistically
significant. This suggests that an increase in the number of governments per unit area
decreases interlocal cooperation. This finding does not confirm the expected relationship
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between the two variables. Hence, the null hypothesis that geographically proximate
localities do not engage in more interlocal cooperation is accepted.
City centers are areas where local government densities can be expected to be
higher. Suburbs are by nature sprawled and occupy large geographic areas, thereby
having lower government densities. Area-wide public authorities and special districts
typically take

up

public-service

delivery as

well

as

economic-development

responsibilities in central areas. In the areas where public authorities control land-use
decisions and special districts provide public services, general purpose local governments
do not need to engage in direct cooperation with one another. This could explain the
anomaly in findings of this study regarding proximity and interlocal cooperation.
However, any claim regarding the effects of special governments on cooperative
activities between general-purpose local governments is out of the scope of this study.
Further analysis will be needed to evaluate this theory.
The expected relationship of the geographic proximity of local governments and
the extent of interlocal cooperation among them could not be substantiated from the data.
The null hypothesis that geographic proximity among local governments does not
influence interlocal cooperation is therefore accepted.

Economic Condition and Interlocal Cooperation
Gross domestic product per capita, median household income, per capita income,
employment, property value, and the index of fiscal distress are variables used to measure
economic performance of localities.
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Gross domestic product per capita is the measure of overall economic
performance of metropolitan region. This study finds that regional economy negatively
influences interlocal cooperation. As the GDP per capita of a region increases, the
aggregate transfer of interlocal revenue among the localities in the region decreases.
Conversely, decrease in regional economic performance enables more cooperation among
localities. This suggests that localities are affected by the economic condition of the
metropolitan region, and the distressed ones respond by purchasing as much urban
services from their neighbors as possible, rather than trying to produce their own. The
findings suggest that localities resort to cooperative measures when they collectively face
economic distress. This also substantiates the theory proposed by Savitch et al. (1993)
that local economies are connected to the regional economy.
Just as GDP per capita measures economic strength of the metropolitan region,
per capita income of localities represents economic vitality at local level. Increase in local
per capita income is found to strongly correlate with increase in interlocal revenue. This
implies that as localities become economically stronger, they develop increased capacity
to produce and export urban services. It is possible that localities with thriving economy
produce and sell urban services to their less affluent neighbors. However, this argument
cannot be fully substantiated until the demand side of this relationship is evaluated by
examining information regarding intergovernmental expenditure of the neighboring
localities.
Employment is another measure of economic vitality used in the study. Increase
in employment opportunities is a sign of a growing economy. This research expected to
find a negative correlation between employment and interlocal cooperation. Apparently,
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different employment sectors influence interlocal cooperation differently. Percentage
employment in growth- and technology-sectors report positive correlations with
interlocal cooperation, whereas percentage employment in manufacturing-sector reports a
negative correlation. These variables produce significant coefficients even when
controlled for spurious effects by including them all in the same analytical model.
Percentage employment in the service sector does not produce significant coefficients in
any of the models.
Growth-sectors such as construction, finance, insurance, real estate, and
technology-sectors such as information services, telecommunication, research, and
development are generally considered developmental activities. The transaction-cost
theory suggests that localities engage in cooperation when it is cheaper to do so
(Williamson, 1979). This study finds that localities cooperate with one another for
collective growth in developmental sector. It is perhaps more beneficial for localities to
cooperate in economic development than to engage in unnecessary competition that
undermines their regional and global competitiveness. This finding contradicts Peterson’s
(1981) theory about interlocal relationship where he suggests that engagement in
developmental activities by localities is generally a sign of interlocal competition.
However, employment in manufacturing-sector is negatively correlated with
interlocal cooperation. Manufacturing-sector claims only about 15 percent of jobs in the
localities selected for this study while they have nearly 45 percent jobs in the technology
sector and the growth sector combined. The transition of cities from a manufacturingbased economy to a service- and information-based economy between 1970 and 2000
was primarily caused by a reduction in the number of manufacturing jobs. Scholars have
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reported that urban industrial jobs either moved out of the urban economic region or
altogether moved to a different country in search of cheap land and labor (Downs, 1994;
Ledebur & Barnes, 1992; Nivola, 1999). Localities that have not transitioned to a service
economy and that continue to depend on manufacturing establishments to enhance their
local economy may still follow the Petersonian logic of interlocal competition. That
explains the negative correlation between employment in the manufacturing sector and
interlocal cooperation.
Household income is found to have a strong negative correlation with interlocal
cooperation. A 1 percent increase in household income corresponds to a 0.6 percent
decrease in interlocal revenue. Household income is different from per capita income in
the way it measures actual family earnings from wages and benefits. Per capita income is
the total earning of an economic region divided by total population and consequently
does not necessarily represent families’ real disposable income. Per capita GDP and
income represent the aggregate economic production of the selected unit of analysis
whereas household income is an indicator of the standard of living. A higher disposable
income allows families to spend more on lifestyle amenities and services. Families with
higher disposable incomes are expected to vote with their feet in search of better lifestyle
services according to the Tieboutean model. The finding of this study suggests that
families with more disposable income do not support the idea of their government
cooperating with neighboring localities, which is consistent with the public-choice theory
and its underlying assumption that localities avoid cooperation in the issues of lifestyle
amenities.
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Property value is another measure of lifestyle choice. Localities with better
lifestyle amenities generally have higher property values, which also serve as a proxy for
fiscal vitality of the local government since higher property values in the locality bring
higher tax revenues to the local government. Property value is found to be negatively
correlated with interlocal cooperation, suggesting that localities endowed with nicer
properties and consequently higher local revenues are reluctant to engage in cooperation
with their neighbors. Conversely, it suggests that localities that experience lower property
values and consequently lower tax revenue engage in interlocal cooperation.
Low household income and lower property value are both signs of a distressed
economy. Lower property value translates into lower revenue from taxes. Similarly,
lower disposable income of families translates into subsistence retail activities and low
levels of lifestyle retail expenditures. Such localities have fewer luxury establishments
such as outlet malls, fine dining, health clubs, and entertainment centers and they
generate less revenue. Their residents have increased demands for public infrastructure
and other social-benefit programs. Residents also face a higher tax burden, but the
localities experience a lower tax-yield. Miller (1995) describes this situation as fiscal
stress. It is hypothesized that localities facing economic and fiscal stress are more likely
to cooperate with their neighbors. The negative correlation between interlocal
cooperation and these distress variables substantiate the hypothesized relationship. This
result is consistent with that of Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) and Leroux and Carr (2007).
In light of the findings that localities cooperate more when faced with economic
distress such as lower gross domestic product, lower property values, and lower
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household income of the residents, the second hypothesis of this research that says
economic distress forces localities to seek cooperative measures, is accepted.

Race and Interlocal Cooperation
This study analyses the effects of race and income inequality of localities on
interlocal cooperation. Besides representing racial makeup by measuring the percentage
of white population and the percentage of African-American population, this study also
measures the homogeneity of localities in terms of absolute difference between the
percentages of the two races.
The coefficients from the regression analysis using data collected at the
metropolitan level suggests that interlocal cooperation decreases with increasing racial
homogeneity. That is to say that the interlocal cooperation between localities within
metropolitan areas increases if the metropolitan region is more heterogeneous. Results
from Model 2 substantiate the finding that interlocal cooperation decreases with increase
in the percentage of whites measured at metropolitan level. One standard deviation
increase in percentage of white population corresponds to decrease in interlocal revenue
by a factor of 0.27 of its standard deviation. This study expected to find a positive
correlation between metropolitan racial homogeneity and regionally aggregated measure
of interlocal cooperation based on the theory that racially homogenous localities can
easily cooperate as they share similar preferences. The findings do not concur with the
expected output.
Consistent with the findings at metropolitan level, coefficient of racial
homogeneity measured at the local level also correlates negatively with interlocal
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cooperation. Increase in percentage of white people corresponds with decrease in
interlocal revenue of localities. Whites are conventionally considered rich compared to
blacks. It is necessary to control for the spurious effect of income on the relationship
between race and interlocal cooperation.

Therefore, the variable representing the

percentage rich population is included in Model 4 to isolate the effect of race alone on
cooperation. Similarly, since the black or African-American population is conventionally
considered to be poor, the variable representing the percentage of poor people is included
in Model 5 to control for the spurious effect of poverty. Despite robust controls, measure
of percentage of whites is found to negatively correlate with interlocal cooperation,
whereas percentage of blacks fails to produce statistically significant coefficient. This
finding does not support the hypothesis of racial homophily and concludes that white
people are reluctant to engage in local cooperation irrespective of neighboring localities’
racial makeup.

Income Inequality and Interlocal Cooperation
Income inequality is another social characteristic evaluated in this study. Just as is
racial segregation, economic segregation is an outcome of metropolitan fragmentation.
Localities have a disproportionate distribution of wealth. It has been hypothesized that
increasing inequality between the rich and poor decreases interlocal cooperation. This
study uses two metrics to measure the extent of income inequality within metropolitan
regions: the Gini index and the percentage of population in different income classes.
Gini represents the spread of wealth between the localities within the metropolitan
region. The analysis shows that the robust coefficient between the Gini index and
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interlocal cooperation is not statistically significant. Gini coefficient of the metropolitan
areas selected for this study has standard deviation of 0.03. Considering that the value of
Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, the data shows small dispersion of 3 percent. This
suggests that the 51 largest metropolitan regions analyzed here have nearly similar index
of income-inequality, which is why Gini index is not able to produce significant
coefficients.
However, variables measuring economic heterogeneity at the local government
level represent sufficiently large sample size, have wider distribution, and produce
significant robust coefficients. The study finds that increase in the percentage of rich
people is negatively correlated while percentage of poor people is positively correlated
with interlocal cooperation. Models 4 and 5 evaluate these variables separately and they
still produce equally strong coefficients. These findings support the hypothesis that
heterogeneity in income negatively affects interlocal cooperation. The results imply that
poor people prefer cooperative methods of urban service delivery whereas rich people do
not. Therefore, in an urban region where neighboring localities have heterogeneous
income classes the condition of reciprocity needed for interlocal cooperation cannot be
achieved.

Size and Interlocal Cooperation
A locality’s population size has been found to be one of the best predictors of
interlocal cooperation.

In each of the models, the population variable produces

statistically significant coefficients. Coefficients of population in all but one model show
that when population increases by one standard deviation, the variable representing
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interlocal cooperation increases by almost half of its standard deviation. Localities with
larger populations have bigger markets for public services. Local governments of larger
jurisdictions need to invest more in public-service provision than their smaller
counterparts. However, with increasing population it is easier to lower per-unit costs
because of the economies of scale. The bivariate correlation between per capita interlocal
revenue and population shows a negative relationship that suggests that per capita
interlocal transfer decreases with increase in population. Hence, service provision
becomes less expensive for large localities when they cooperate with their neighbors.
However, this study chose to use population as a control variable rather than a
predictor. As the dependent variable is measured in terms of interlocal revenue, localities
with higher populations naturally have more demand for public services, and therefore
more interlocal revenue. Thus, size can have severe endogenous problems if interpreted
as a predictor variable.

Senior Population and Interlocal Cooperation
This study uses percentage of senior population to control for age variations
between localities. This demographic group is conventionally found to actively
participate in town-hall meetings and has also reported the highest turnout in elections.
Senior population is found to have a statistically significant positive correlation with
interlocal cooperation. One standard-deviation increase in percentage of senior
population causes interlocal revenue to increase by about 0.7 percent of its standard
deviation. The magnitude of this relationship is not very strong, but it does tell a good
deal about the direction of the relationship. Senior demographic are comparatively less
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mobile in terms of their place of residence, they have limited sources of income, and they
want to ensure uninterrupted services at the lowest possible cost in their chosen
jurisdiction. Lower per capita cost for urban services is possible when economies of scale
are achieved through cooperation.

Age of the Economy and Interlocal Cooperation
Age of the economy is another control variable in this study. Older cities tend to
have more public infrastructure than their newer counterparts. The aging infrastructures
of older cities have higher maintenance costs. Conversely, new localities have modern
infrastructures and require less investment in maintenance and upkeep than older
localities. It seems logical to assume that newer localities are better off cooperating with
those that are older to provide urban infrastructure because it is cost effective to share
than to produce it solely. However, this study does not provide conclusive a result about
this issue. Age of the economy, which has been measured as the median age of built
structures in a locality, fails to produce a significant coefficient in any of the models.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The need for local cooperation itself alludes to the existence of a large number of
jurisdictions that enjoy their share of power of self-governance. The U.S.A. is founded on
the principle of pluralism, and the culture of jurisdictional sovereignty that set its roots
centuries ago during the era of independence still resonates in modern day politics, both
state and local.
American urban culture is predominantly polycentric. However, preference for
autonomous urban governments has led to further fragmentation and demographic
segregation. Sorting in terms of income and race has created a patchwork of localities
with different levels of competitiveness. Competition among localities for mobile
businesses and residents by attempting to lure them with credit-laden infrastructure and
insurmountable economic benefits puts all of them in a downward spiral. Scholars have
suggested consolidating smaller jurisdictions into one giant regional unit to end spillovers
and correct the negative effects of policy differences. Some metropolitan areas have even
embarked upon this experiment.
The question of success or failure of consolidation still triggers engaging
discussions among urban scholars but the issue remains inconclusive to date. Besides the
uncertainty of its efficacy, consolidation is considered one of the most difficult methods
for regional governance. The easiest path to regional governance is through voluntary ad
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hoc cooperation among localities. This is a system of random, temporary networks
created on the basis of their specific needs and preferences. However, not all localities are
found to engage in cooperation equally. The formation of cooperative networks is
influenced by their political preferences, economic capacity, social structure, and
geographical limitations.

Why Do Some Localities Cooperate More Than Others?
This research is a pursuit of identification of local characteristics that influence
interlocal cooperation. It strives to find credible answer to why some localities cooperate
more than others. This study uses robust methods designed to overcome the statistical
limitations of previous studies done to identify local characteristics that influence
interlocal cooperation. Using an aggregate data including more than two dozen variables
measuring local characteristics of 1,164 localities within 51 largest metropolitan regions,
this is one of the most comprehensive studies in its category.
The study finds substantial evidence that political fragmentation of metropolitan
regions has a positive effect on cooperation among localities. It finds conclusive proof
that economic distress causes localities to seek partners for mutual cooperation. It also
concludes that racial homogeneity and economic inequality decreases interlocal
cooperation.
Urban fragmentation is considered the cause of numerous urban problems.
Concentration of the rich and poor in different urban pockets translates into fiscal
disparities between the localities, which affect the capacities of those localities to produce
and provide public services. Although some scholars favor consolidation of localities into
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area-wide regional governments to solve the problems associated with fragmentation, it
requires relinquishing the power of self-governance by the localities, which makes it an
unpopular choice. Localities can reap the benefits of regional governance by voluntarily
engaging into cooperative relations with their neighbors without giving up their right to
self-governance.
Metropolitan fragmentation plays a dual role of segregating urban population into
multiple and characteristically diverse local jurisdictions, while simultaneously creating
multitude of localities that can engage in cooperative governance. This study finds
credible evidence that the centripetal forces of cooperation are stronger than centrifugal
forces of segregation and competition. Robust quantitative analysis produces results
suggesting a positive role of metropolitan fragmentation in formation of cooperative
networks among localities. The finding favors the concept of regional governance in
absence of regional government. It also provides evidence that fragmented localities
create local public economies through random voluntary cooperative networks as
theorized by Parks and Oakerson’s (1989).
Interlocal cooperation is, however, selective rather than holistic. This study finds
that localities cooperate with their neighbors on the issues of growth and economic
development but not on issues that involve land use policies, desegregation, and income
redistribution. The skepticism expressed by Norris (2001) about selective cooperation
among localities is found to be valid. Localities easily cooperate on issues of common
interests and not on those involving competitive individual benefits. They are found to
contribute towards strengthening regional economy when they collectively face economic
distress, but not on policies that would ensure revenue redistribution and standardization
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of urban amenities. This is a strong indication that economic growth has regional
footprint to which the economies of individual localities are tied, as suggested by Savitch
et al. (1993).
While this research does not separately analyze cooperation related to systemsmaintenance and lifestyle services, it uses measures of local characteristics, some of
which represent lifestyle choices of residents. Property value is a proxy for the residents’
lifestyle choices as it translates into local revenue and better urban infrastructure. The
finding that localities with higher property values engage in less interlocal cooperation is
a strong indication that lifestyle amenities are not on the bargaining table.
Local economic development has been conventionally seen as a competitive
policy arena. Localities have been theorized to engage in aggressive developmental
activities through which they attract residents and businesses to achieve a competitive
edge against their neighbors. According to Peterson (1981) increased developmental
activities in metropolitan-regions signify higher levels of competition among localities.
The findings of this study show benefits of scale-economies and shared risks on
investments accrued through interlocal cooperation outweigh smaller gains from
competitive economic development.

In contrast with Peterson’s (1981) hypothesis,

localities with thriving technology- and growth-sectors are found to engage in interlocal
cooperation for economic development.
Racial makeup and wealth distribution across metropolitan regions influence how
localities interact with one another. Localities with majority white population have been
found to disapprove of interlocal cooperation, whereas African Americans have been
found to be indifferent toward it. Since, suburbanization is considered an outcome of
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white flight from the city centers, white antipathy towards interlocal cooperation is hardly
a surprise. However, theories claiming aversion of the African-Americans toward
interlocal cooperation based on fear of political dilution needs a closer evaluation. Such
an aversion probably exists against local government consolidations but not against
voluntary cooperation where local autonomy is not threatened.

Rather than racial

prejudices, poverty among minority population influences interlocal cooperation. Higher
percentage of poor people has been found to positively influence interlocal cooperation
whereas higher percentage of rich people is found not to.

Implications for Academic Research
This comprehensive study has far reaching implications in the fields of urban
politics, metropolitan governance, interlocal relations, and local economic development.
It plays an important role in validating relationships posited by its predecessors and
identifying new ones.
Literature on urban political economy and urban governance generally link
metropolitan fragmentation with jurisdictional competition, negative externalities, and
socio-economic inequity. Regional consolidation of local political powers is generally
prescribed as magical remedy to those problems. This study strives to move focus from
structural reform of urban governments to non structural solutions based on voluntary
networks. Findings from this research highlight a new aspect of metropolitan
fragmentation–its role in increasing possibilities for cooperative networks among urban
localities–, which is a less explored avenue in scholarly research thus far.
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This study further extends the argument to cooperation among localities in
developmental-sector. Prevailing urban theories and a majority of scholarly works
consider that urban localities compete with one another for economic resources. The citylimits theory even argues that localities in fragmented urban regions have no alternative
to zero-sum competition. This study not only provides ample evidence of local
cooperation in developmental activities, it initiates scholarly discussion about how cities
transform from competitors to cooperators as their economy transitioned from
manufacturing to information-technology and services.
Selective cooperation among urban localities is another key implication to be
drawn from the findings of this analysis. Although, research hypotheses are only focused
on the effects of economic distress on interlocal cooperation, the study generates findings
that have far-reaching significance. Localities cooperate in various policy sectors, most
common of which is urban utilities such as water supply, sewage treatment, snow
removal, solid waste management and the like that are commonly referred to as systemsmanagement services (Williams, 1967). Cooperation on production of such services
accrue benefits due to economy of scale. Localities find it difficult to cooperate in
lifestyle services such as urban parks, recreational facilities, security and policing, and
the like because common consumption of those services create free-rider problem.
Cooperation in developmental activities such as construction and maintenance of city
roads, public transit, ports, airports, sports arenas, convention centers, and the like is
dependent on the need for and the financial capacity of individual localities. Even though
this study does not differentiate between various arenas for cooperation, the findings of
this research help initiate further scholarly discussion on the topic.
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Limitations of This Study
Just as with any quantitative study based on a large database, the results produced
by this study can be confidently generalized. However, comprehensiveness sometimes
blurs low-level details, and this research is not an exception to that risk. Other
methodological issues such as sample type, measurement of variables, and data sources
are some of the limitations of this study.
Findings of this study are based on analysis of large aggregate data. Data
aggregation may inflate or deflate the influence of a variable, especially when the data is
not normally distributed. A randomly selected pair of localities might not show the same
magnitude and direction of relationships as predicted by the generalized model. It would
require a pair-wise analysis of select individual localities to evaluate individual
characteristics. This research can serve as a starting point for scholars interested in
conducting such pairwise studies.
This research uses information about localities within 51 largest metropolitan
areas. This selection method removes mid-sized metropolitan areas and small
micropolitan areas from the analysis. In the case of some variables such as Gini
coefficient, limiting the study to only 51 metropolitan areas has failed to produce
sufficient variation, thus reducing the chances of getting significant robust coefficients.

Avenues for Further Research
This manuscript uses a substantially large dataset to study the influence of local
characteristics on interlocal cooperation so that the findings can be generalized. In an
aggregate analysis such as this one, it is challenging to operationalize the dependent
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variable that captures all types of interlocal cooperation. Future research should avoid
some of the following methodological limitations associated with this study.

Measuring non-monetary cooperation
This study uses interlocal revenue transfer as the dependent variable that
measures the extent of cooperative activities between local governments that involve
monetary exchange. However, local governments also engage in cooperation that does
not require exchange of funds. Cooperative activities between neighboring localities such
as implementation of similar land use policies and adoption of uniform tax rates are not
reflected in monetary transfer between them. Similarly, if localities provide different
services of comparable monetary value across each other’s jurisdictions, they engage in
cooperation without having to exchange money. Cooperative activities that do not
involve monetary transfer are not included in this analysis. Cooperation that does not
require monetary transfer seems much easier to materialize since it does not necessitates
fiscal commitments. Future research using a more appropriate measure for the dependent
variable can provide better insight on non-monetary cooperation between localities.

Interlocal expenditure as a measure of cooperation
The use of interlocal revenue as the dependent variable also limits this research to
only those localities that report receiving money from other local governments. When a
locality provides urban services to neighboring localities, it receives payments in the
form of revenue. A locality that is totally dependent upon its neighbors for urban services
does not report any interlocal revenue. Its cooperative engagements with its neighbors are
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recorded as interlocal expenditure. Similar research using interlocal expenditure as the
dependent variable will complement the findings of this study.

Public Authorities and Special Districts as institutions for indirect cooperation
This study measures cooperation between general-purpose governments.
However, a majority of urban services are provided by special districts and public
authorities. Many local governments are delegating their service production and even
provision responsibilities on these semi-public institutions. Such institutions are more
active in the metropolitan centers where local governments are in close proximity with
each other. Role of public authorities and special districts in cooperative urban
governance is not evaluated in this study. Future research can be focused on measuring
the extent of the public services provided by the general-purpose governments and
compare that to those provided by the special purpose governments. Considering that the
special purpose governments have multi-jurisdictional operating boundaries, they make it
possible for localities to engage indirectly into collective action. This is the least studied
topic in metropolitan governance and carries immense potential for research.
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ENDNOTES
1
2

2012 American Community Survey 5-year estimates
Definition

obtained

from

the

Census

Bureau’s

official

web

portal

http://www.census.gov/govs/go/municipal_township_govs.html
3

Post (2002) uses number of governments per square mile as a measure. I chose to use

number per 100 square miles as it gives a sense of a mediocre size region. The strength
and direction of relationship is not affected using either index.
4

https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/poverty-cal-in-acs.pdf

If a family’s total income is less than the dollar value of the appropriate threshold, then
that family and every individual in it are considered to be in poverty. Similarly, if an
unrelated individual’s total income is less than the appropriate threshold, then that
individual is considered to be in poverty. Poverty thresholds do not vary geographically.
They are updated annually to allow for changes in the cost of living (inflation factor)
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
5

A Gini coefficient for analysis between localities within MSAs has been calculated

using the number of households that fall within census-designated income categories. All
households within a particular income cohort are assumed to be earning the mediandollar value of their respective income range. This calculation method was developed by
Angus Deaton (Deaton, 1997), which can be summarized by following expression:
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Where, u is the average income of population, Pi is the income rank P of household i,
with income X. The richest household (with highest median dollar value) receives a rank
of 1 and the poorest a rank of N. A Gini coefficient comparing inequalities between
MSAs has been calculated using the same expression shown previously with the only
difference being the use of per capita personal income for each MSA to calculate the
index.
5

The rationale goes back to Alfred Marshall’s economics and well beyond. These

principles state that the clustering of functions makes industry more productive, efficient
and innovative. Infrastructure investment is necessary for clustering. Also, supply-side
economics lends its weight to infrastructure investment because it increases profits and
furthers incentives for industry. This, in turn, leads to more economic development
(Marshall, 1920, Porter, 1995 and Glaeser, 2011).
6

The Census Bureau defines the central counties as those containing all or a substantial

portion of the urbanized area. These counties are used when measuring commuting
patterns with other counties that qualify as outlying counties. Municipalities, cities, and
towns that are completely or partially (majority of the area) in central counties are
considered central cities, or central towns, and those in outlying counties are considered
accordingly.
7

The analysis uses robustbase package in R statistical software. Technical

documentation for this package can be found in the following link:
http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/robustbase/robustbase.pdf
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